NYTimes: Top Indian Security Official Resigns as Toll Eclipses 180
Who resigned after the Sept 11 attacks?
Showing posts with label terrorism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label terrorism. Show all posts
Austrian hostages freed
Months ago, two Austrian tourists were kidnapped by AQIM in Algeria (probably in Tunisia but whatever). They were freed on Oct 31. I didn't put anything on my blog because I was hoping for some actual news reports in the media other than a one-line sentence saying they had been freed, but I am disappointed. So, no info that I've seen on where they were held, what the kidnappers got in return, or anything like that. And disappointingly to me, no information on what role if any local Tuareg factions played in the negotiations that led to their release. Oh well.
Here are my previous two pieces on the Austrian hostages: AQIM/GSPC kidnaps two in Tunisia, and Update on Austrian hostages of AQIM.
Here are my previous two pieces on the Austrian hostages: AQIM/GSPC kidnaps two in Tunisia, and Update on Austrian hostages of AQIM.
Another post at the Media Shack
In which I earn a T-shirt (and post on AQIM in Algeria). If I get stopped at airports for wearing my green Arabic Media Shack T-shirt I will definitely post on that as well. Also I just noticed they have a Middle East Media Guide, a guide to some of the more prominent newspapers in the Middle East. Worth checking out if you (like me) don't read the newspapers regularly enough to get a feel for them but still cite them occasionally.
War on Terror in the Sahara
I have a long piece on the War on Terror in the Sahara desert up at Rob's Arabic Media Shack. I wrote it before the recent attack by AQIM in Mauritania, but oh well.
Also thanks to the Western Sahara Info blog that gave me a couple links. An apparent communique from AQIM that is translated there seems to confirm what I wrote tentatively about in my piece at the Arabic Media Shack - that Mokhtar Belmokhtar is no longer the head of AQIM-South (perhaps he's relaxing on the beach in Benin) and has been replaced by Yahia Djouadi. I believe he was previously head of AQIM's military committee, so he's likely to be on board with Droukdel's pro-bin-Ladin-ism. That will make it interesting to see whether there are a lot of defections from Belmokhtar's former gang, as Belmokhtar reportedly was not big on martyring himself for the greater glory of the Caliphate.
Also thanks to the Western Sahara Info blog that gave me a couple links. An apparent communique from AQIM that is translated there seems to confirm what I wrote tentatively about in my piece at the Arabic Media Shack - that Mokhtar Belmokhtar is no longer the head of AQIM-South (perhaps he's relaxing on the beach in Benin) and has been replaced by Yahia Djouadi. I believe he was previously head of AQIM's military committee, so he's likely to be on board with Droukdel's pro-bin-Ladin-ism. That will make it interesting to see whether there are a lot of defections from Belmokhtar's former gang, as Belmokhtar reportedly was not big on martyring himself for the greater glory of the Caliphate.
Also through Western Sahara Info's blogroll I found a few more good blogs: Parmenides' Fallacy, The Moor Next Door, and Nick Brook's Sand & Dust.
Sageman vs. Hoffman
After the Grand Masta's chidings, I have a post up at Arabic Mediashack on the dustup between Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman over where to focus anti-Al Qaeda efforts.
Looking at insurgencies, and data selection
Via Zenpundit, I came across a good article in Armed Forces Journal by Capt. Robert Chamberlain that looks at the faulty idea that insurgencies/counterinsurgencies always take a long time:
When academics study insurgencies en masse, they create databases full of very bloody, long insurgencies that kill lots of people but ignore the many many more small, short-lived insurgencies. Consequently our understanding of insurgency as a mode of conflict is skewed towards large bloody messes. I'd hazard a guess that this problem doesn't have the same degree of impact in studying conventional wars, because conventional wars are easier to find in the historical record, and usually the combatants are states that wield significant combat power, meaning there aren't as many kitchen fires that don't turn into five-alarm blazes.
The problem of data selection is cemented in the Correlates of War database. This database is a one-stop shop for researchers on war, but it only counts conflicts that result in more than one thousand battle deaths. Some sort of filter like that is necessary or else the data set would be too large to be useful. The problem comes when researchers like Paul Collier take the COW data, look at intra-state conflict and extrapolate their findings to all intra-state conflict ever, instead of just intra-state conflict with more than 1000 battle deaths.
Using COW data, Collier and Hoeffler reached the conclusion that rebellions happen when there exist opportunities for rebellion (rather than grievances for rebellion). Had they thought about the limitations of their data, they would have realized that their argument only showed that rebellions survive to create conflicts large enough to appear on COW's radar when the opportunity exists for large rebellions - and that rebellions driven by grievances might occur in hostile environments for rebellion but would be wiped out quickly, like the 1963 rebellion by the Kel Adagh.
Dan Byman, the head of my old program, said something related in a talk a couple months ago. He noted that a lot of people argue that terrorism doesn't kill large numbers of people. Byman argued that's only true because when terrorism does start to kill lots of people, we don't call it terrorism any more. Exhibit A, the firebombings of Germany and Tokyo. Exhibit B, the 1990s civil war in Algeria. Exhibit C, the situation in Iraq.
This whole problem is similar to Taleb's idea of "silent evidence" - in order to understand big house fires, you have to look at the big fires themselves, as well as small fires that don't become big fires. Only then can you really understand what factors are important in turning small fires into big ones (click the link to see that even Harvard professors do not understand this concept).
The point of Chamberlain's article was that the mantra that 'counterinsurgency campaigns take a long time' has been used as an excuse for the failure to provide a coherent strategy for a favorable outcome in Iraq and Afghanistan:
It is simply untrue that counterinsurgencies are inherently long-term struggles.When I started studying the Tuareg insurgencies in Mali and Niger, I was surprised to learn that there had been an insurgency in 1963-1964 in Mali. I had never heard of it, because it hadn't killed very many people. One Tuareg clan - the Kel Adagh, based near Kidal, Mali - rebelled against the Malian government and were brutally crushed in short order. As I wrote in my thesis:
The Malian Army crushed the Kel Adagh rebellion by using widespread violence against civilians, torture, declaring the countryside outside of a few towns a vast free-fire zone, poisoning wells necessary for any activity outside towns, killing Tuareg herds of cattle and camels to force them into the cities, executing the religious and political leaders of both rebel and neutral clans, and threatening napalm bombing from fighter-bombers.In Chamberlain's metaphor, this was a "kitchen fire" rather than a five-alarm blaze, and because it did not reach 1000 battle deaths, the 1963 rebellion does not appear in the main intra-state war database, Correlates of War (COW).
When academics study insurgencies en masse, they create databases full of very bloody, long insurgencies that kill lots of people but ignore the many many more small, short-lived insurgencies. Consequently our understanding of insurgency as a mode of conflict is skewed towards large bloody messes. I'd hazard a guess that this problem doesn't have the same degree of impact in studying conventional wars, because conventional wars are easier to find in the historical record, and usually the combatants are states that wield significant combat power, meaning there aren't as many kitchen fires that don't turn into five-alarm blazes.
The problem of data selection is cemented in the Correlates of War database. This database is a one-stop shop for researchers on war, but it only counts conflicts that result in more than one thousand battle deaths. Some sort of filter like that is necessary or else the data set would be too large to be useful. The problem comes when researchers like Paul Collier take the COW data, look at intra-state conflict and extrapolate their findings to all intra-state conflict ever, instead of just intra-state conflict with more than 1000 battle deaths.
Using COW data, Collier and Hoeffler reached the conclusion that rebellions happen when there exist opportunities for rebellion (rather than grievances for rebellion). Had they thought about the limitations of their data, they would have realized that their argument only showed that rebellions survive to create conflicts large enough to appear on COW's radar when the opportunity exists for large rebellions - and that rebellions driven by grievances might occur in hostile environments for rebellion but would be wiped out quickly, like the 1963 rebellion by the Kel Adagh.
Dan Byman, the head of my old program, said something related in a talk a couple months ago. He noted that a lot of people argue that terrorism doesn't kill large numbers of people. Byman argued that's only true because when terrorism does start to kill lots of people, we don't call it terrorism any more. Exhibit A, the firebombings of Germany and Tokyo. Exhibit B, the 1990s civil war in Algeria. Exhibit C, the situation in Iraq.
This whole problem is similar to Taleb's idea of "silent evidence" - in order to understand big house fires, you have to look at the big fires themselves, as well as small fires that don't become big fires. Only then can you really understand what factors are important in turning small fires into big ones (click the link to see that even Harvard professors do not understand this concept).
The point of Chamberlain's article was that the mantra that 'counterinsurgency campaigns take a long time' has been used as an excuse for the failure to provide a coherent strategy for a favorable outcome in Iraq and Afghanistan:
According to conventional wisdom, we will be in Iraq and Afghanistan for at least 10 years because they are insurgencies, and that’s how long insurgencies take...Fabius Maximus continues this point by arguing that when an insurgency has carried on long enough and is damaging enough for a country to beg for large-scale American military involvement, that country is probably doomed to lose anyway. A more effective counterinsurgency strategy for the United States would focus on the small "kitchen fires", and try to keep those kitchen fires from becoming big fires, rather than reacting late to put out big fires.
This is an abdication of the responsibilities of strategic leadership. The American public is owed more of an explanation than, “Well, these things take a while.” It is owed a comprehensive strategic vision...
More on the CIA case in Italy
Now that Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi is involved in the CIA trial/debacle in Italy, American news outlets will finally cover it. There are articles about it in the New York Times, LA Times, AP, etc. The Jurist blog has a good article on it too. Münzenberg's hopes have been realized.
The latest news is about Abu Omar's wife testifying how he was tortured for 14 months in Egyptian jails. One of the Italian codefendants, the former head of Italy's military intelligence service (who denies having assisted CIA in Abu Omar's kidnapping), objected to Abu Omar's wife testifying in a veil because her clothing was "a symbol of fanatacism and extremism." Gee whiz, why won't Europe's Muslims integrate faster?
Now seems a good time to plug a post over at Small Wars Journal's blog called The Children of the Left, on the long-term blowback from abandoning our values.
Deterring Al Qaeda
I have a guest-post up at the Arabic Media Shack about deterring Al Qaeda. Go read it!
Update on Austrian hostages of AQIM
A short update on the situation with Austrian hostages taken by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which I earlier blogged about here.
In my earlier post, I hypothesized that the hostage-takers were in it for the money rather than a crusade against the West. The alternative would be that Droukdel, the nominal leader of AQIM who is behind recent Iraq-style simultaneous carbombings, was also behind the hostage-taking, and would behead them on television or somehow use them for purposes other than extortion. Some pointed to an attack in Mauritania where four French tourists were shot by some random dudes that the Mauritanian government claimed were Al Qaeda (you don't get GWOT funding from the US if tourists are killed by bandits, only if they are killed by Al Qaeda), and thought that the current hostage crisis was the same type of deal.
Well multiple deadlines for ransom have passed an by all accounts the Austrian hostages are still alive. The hostages may not be in northern Mali after all, or they may have once been in northern Mali but have been moved elsewhere. (Update, missed this story at Temoust, apparently they are in constant movement.)
It looks like negotiations have been pretty successful so far - demands have moved from "release all these guys in Algerian prisons (and pay us lots of money)!" to the more achievable "release a Muslim couple in jail in Austria, and withdraw your four guys from Afghanistan (and pay us lots of money)." The Austrian government which previously declared it would not pay ransoms, now says: "We want to achieve a humanitarian goal and are resolutely aiming for that."
My guess is that the hostages will be freed and Austria will, like Germany five years ago, deny having paid a ransom, wink wink.
In my earlier post, I hypothesized that the hostage-takers were in it for the money rather than a crusade against the West. The alternative would be that Droukdel, the nominal leader of AQIM who is behind recent Iraq-style simultaneous carbombings, was also behind the hostage-taking, and would behead them on television or somehow use them for purposes other than extortion. Some pointed to an attack in Mauritania where four French tourists were shot by some random dudes that the Mauritanian government claimed were Al Qaeda (you don't get GWOT funding from the US if tourists are killed by bandits, only if they are killed by Al Qaeda), and thought that the current hostage crisis was the same type of deal.
Well multiple deadlines for ransom have passed an by all accounts the Austrian hostages are still alive. The hostages may not be in northern Mali after all, or they may have once been in northern Mali but have been moved elsewhere. (Update, missed this story at Temoust, apparently they are in constant movement.)
It looks like negotiations have been pretty successful so far - demands have moved from "release all these guys in Algerian prisons (and pay us lots of money)!" to the more achievable "release a Muslim couple in jail in Austria, and withdraw your four guys from Afghanistan (and pay us lots of money)." The Austrian government which previously declared it would not pay ransoms, now says: "We want to achieve a humanitarian goal and are resolutely aiming for that."
My guess is that the hostages will be freed and Austria will, like Germany five years ago, deny having paid a ransom, wink wink.
AQIM/GSPC kidnaps two in Tunisia
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, aka the Groupe Salafist pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC, standing for Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) took two Austrian tourists hostage in Tunisia. The Austrians were kidnapped between February 18th and 25th, but the GSPC only put out an announcement on Monday. The two hostages are now apparently in Mali, near Kidal. This bears some resemblance to the GSPC's last high-profile kidnapping effort in 2003. As with everything in the Sahara, facts are hard to come by.
Here are the facts as I understand them about the current kidnapping situation. The two Austrians, Andrea Kloiber and Wolfgang Ebner, were kidnapped in February in Tunisia, or maybe Algeria. Ms. Kloiber is a nurse and Mr. Ebner is a consultant. Austria is proclaiming that it will not negotiate with the GSPC. A GSPC spokesman says that if their demands are not met by Sunday, the Ms. Kloiber and Mr. Ebner will be executed.
It's my guess that the GSPC held off on announcing their kidnapping until they had been transported from Tunisia to outside Kidal, Mali, where they possibly are being held. This is a journey of over a thousand miles. Assuming the couple were actually kidnapped in Tunisia rather than getting lost and ending up in Algeria, that means that the GSPC was able to transport two foreign hostages across the Tunisian/Algerian border, across the length of Algeria, across the Algerian/Malian border, probably through the smuggling routes near Tin-Za, and to north-western Mali. Even if the couple was abducted in Algeria instead of Tunisia, the GSPC still had to transport them across the entirety of Algeria and across an international border without being detected, demonstrating impressive logistics.
My guess is that they are somewhere in the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains. This is due to the pictures I've seen and because they've been reported in both Kidal and Tessalit. If true this would mean that presumably they have come to some sort of arrangement with Malian Tuareg groups that control that region. The GSPC's guy in northern Mali, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, has cooperated with Tuareg leaders in the past on smuggling, but they had a falling out in 2006 when the Tuareg rebel group ADC (Alliance for Democracy and Change) ambushed a bunch of GSPC fighters at a meeting over smuggling rights in order to get in the good graces of the Algerians who were negotiating peace between the ADC and Mali at the time.
Mokhtar Belmokhtar, aka Khaled Abu al-Abbas, aka Benouar, aka "The One-Eyed", is more of a smuggler and criminal than a hardcore ideological terrorist. His outfit, also known as the GSL (Groupe Salafiste Liberation, or Free Salafist Group) started as a smuggling ring and joined up with the GSPC later, probably out of profit motive. He was reported killed in clashes between the ADC and his GSPC smuggling outfit back in September 2006. He was also reportedly killed last month. Apparently he's still alive, as I've heard recently from some local military people that he was trying to secure amnesty from various governments so he could take his cash and retire.
Clay Varney at Threatswatch writes that this move should be seen as a move targeting Westerners similar to the killing of four French tourists in Mali last December. First, as far as I know, there was no evidence of GSPC/AQIM responsibility for those killings beyond claims by the Mauritanian government. It's just as possible that the perps were common criminals. Second, I think it is more likely that GSPC is simply looking for leverage in attaining specific demands, especially if the GSPC simply came across these Austrians as they were lost in the desert, rather than planning an elaborate operation. GSPC claims to have treated the hostages well so far and is trying to use them for ransom, demanding the release of imprisoned GSPC members and possibly cash as well. If it was an attack designed to specifically target Westerners, Frau Kloiber and Herr Ebner would already be dead.
The GSPC is split between one faction who is ideologically close to Osama bin Ladin's Al Qaeda and focused on a global struggle, and another faction that is more focused on Algeria and opposed the two declarations of allegiance to Al Qaeda, the first in 2003 and the second in January 2007 that accompanied their official name change to AQIM. Abdelmalek el-Droukdel (aka Abu Musab abd al-Wadoud), the current official leader of the group, is the driving force behind the pledge of allegiance to bin Ladin. Hassan Hattab is representative of the opposition within GSPC. He surrendered to Algerian authorities last October in order to gain protection from Droukdel's men who were trying to kill him. Belmokhtar, also against the name change and allegiance to Al Qaeda, had a falling out with Droukdel in January 2007.
Thus if it's true that the two hostages are being held in Mali, then it's likely that the Austrians were captured by GSPC elements loyal to Hattab or Belmokhtar and transported down to Mali so the kidnappers could benefit monetarily. It seems unlikely that Droukdel would take such trouble and risk to transport hostages over a thousand miles to Belmokhtar's area of operations given the efforts Droukdel has taken to marginalize Belmokhtar. Droukdel, the force behind the GSPC's increased targeting of Westerners, might not even be in the loop.
Bottom line: I don't know anything for certain! But this is what seems likely to me.
Here are the facts as I understand them about the current kidnapping situation. The two Austrians, Andrea Kloiber and Wolfgang Ebner, were kidnapped in February in Tunisia, or maybe Algeria. Ms. Kloiber is a nurse and Mr. Ebner is a consultant. Austria is proclaiming that it will not negotiate with the GSPC. A GSPC spokesman says that if their demands are not met by Sunday, the Ms. Kloiber and Mr. Ebner will be executed.
It's my guess that the GSPC held off on announcing their kidnapping until they had been transported from Tunisia to outside Kidal, Mali, where they possibly are being held. This is a journey of over a thousand miles. Assuming the couple were actually kidnapped in Tunisia rather than getting lost and ending up in Algeria, that means that the GSPC was able to transport two foreign hostages across the Tunisian/Algerian border, across the length of Algeria, across the Algerian/Malian border, probably through the smuggling routes near Tin-Za, and to north-western Mali. Even if the couple was abducted in Algeria instead of Tunisia, the GSPC still had to transport them across the entirety of Algeria and across an international border without being detected, demonstrating impressive logistics.
My guess is that they are somewhere in the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains. This is due to the pictures I've seen and because they've been reported in both Kidal and Tessalit. If true this would mean that presumably they have come to some sort of arrangement with Malian Tuareg groups that control that region. The GSPC's guy in northern Mali, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, has cooperated with Tuareg leaders in the past on smuggling, but they had a falling out in 2006 when the Tuareg rebel group ADC (Alliance for Democracy and Change) ambushed a bunch of GSPC fighters at a meeting over smuggling rights in order to get in the good graces of the Algerians who were negotiating peace between the ADC and Mali at the time.
Mokhtar Belmokhtar, aka Khaled Abu al-Abbas, aka Benouar, aka "The One-Eyed", is more of a smuggler and criminal than a hardcore ideological terrorist. His outfit, also known as the GSL (Groupe Salafiste Liberation, or Free Salafist Group) started as a smuggling ring and joined up with the GSPC later, probably out of profit motive. He was reported killed in clashes between the ADC and his GSPC smuggling outfit back in September 2006. He was also reportedly killed last month. Apparently he's still alive, as I've heard recently from some local military people that he was trying to secure amnesty from various governments so he could take his cash and retire.
Clay Varney at Threatswatch writes that this move should be seen as a move targeting Westerners similar to the killing of four French tourists in Mali last December. First, as far as I know, there was no evidence of GSPC/AQIM responsibility for those killings beyond claims by the Mauritanian government. It's just as possible that the perps were common criminals. Second, I think it is more likely that GSPC is simply looking for leverage in attaining specific demands, especially if the GSPC simply came across these Austrians as they were lost in the desert, rather than planning an elaborate operation. GSPC claims to have treated the hostages well so far and is trying to use them for ransom, demanding the release of imprisoned GSPC members and possibly cash as well. If it was an attack designed to specifically target Westerners, Frau Kloiber and Herr Ebner would already be dead.
The GSPC is split between one faction who is ideologically close to Osama bin Ladin's Al Qaeda and focused on a global struggle, and another faction that is more focused on Algeria and opposed the two declarations of allegiance to Al Qaeda, the first in 2003 and the second in January 2007 that accompanied their official name change to AQIM. Abdelmalek el-Droukdel (aka Abu Musab abd al-Wadoud), the current official leader of the group, is the driving force behind the pledge of allegiance to bin Ladin. Hassan Hattab is representative of the opposition within GSPC. He surrendered to Algerian authorities last October in order to gain protection from Droukdel's men who were trying to kill him. Belmokhtar, also against the name change and allegiance to Al Qaeda, had a falling out with Droukdel in January 2007.
Thus if it's true that the two hostages are being held in Mali, then it's likely that the Austrians were captured by GSPC elements loyal to Hattab or Belmokhtar and transported down to Mali so the kidnappers could benefit monetarily. It seems unlikely that Droukdel would take such trouble and risk to transport hostages over a thousand miles to Belmokhtar's area of operations given the efforts Droukdel has taken to marginalize Belmokhtar. Droukdel, the force behind the GSPC's increased targeting of Westerners, might not even be in the loop.
Bottom line: I don't know anything for certain! But this is what seems likely to me.
Intel and Counter-Terrorism
Since quitting my job in December, I've been able to go to more talks and events during the day. I went to a couple talks at Georgetown this past week on intelligence and counterterrorism. Below are some of my takeaways.
The first talk was by Michael Leiter, Acting Director of the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC). Although a friend and I spent most of his talk trying to figure out what audience he thought he was addressing (retirement home? Community library? We finally settled on girl scout troupe), the Q&A session got more interesting and in depth. A couple gems of information:
Sheehan spent a little time talking about what he called the "Maginot Line" of counterterrorism - stuff like scanning incoming shipping containers for radiation, trying to catch terrorists at border crossings, etc. Sheehan feels the centers of gravity for counterterrorism operations need to be basic intelligence tradecraft, police work, and eliminating the hype so people feel comfortable getting on with life after a terrorist attack. He noted that the Brits were taking the subway in London three hours after the 7/7 attacks, and that Israelis go back to the mall the day after it was hit. This of course requires that uninformed speculation be kept to a minimum.
Update: I believe "Quintin" at NCTC is Quintan Wiktorowicz. I stumbled across an article in the International Review of Social History on using popular intellectuals as a "point of contention" in framing contests in fighting Al Qaeda.
Quintan Wiktorowicz. Framing Jihad: Intramovement Framing Contests and al-Qaeda's Struggle for Sacred Authority. International Review of Social History, Volume 49, Supplement S12, December 2004, pp 159-177.
The first talk was by Michael Leiter, Acting Director of the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC). Although a friend and I spent most of his talk trying to figure out what audience he thought he was addressing (retirement home? Community library? We finally settled on girl scout troupe), the Q&A session got more interesting and in depth. A couple gems of information:
- NCTC has (barely) more actual employees than contractors (450 vs. 400), something Leiter is rather proud of and justifiably so, given the ratio in other parts of the intel community (CIFA is over 70% contractors).
- The information flow from top down (that is to say, from DNI or DHS down to local cops) is OK, it is much more difficult for information to flow up, from local cops/intel shops up to the feds. I interpret this to mean that they've managed to solve the classification troubles where locals weren't cleared to view the information sent to them, but have yet to solve the problem of useless intel being sent up the chain of command.
- Leiter feels that having law enforcement and intelligence powers in the same organization is a good thing. Bill Odom feels the opposite - in his book Fixing Intelligence, Gen. Odom argues that you can't have cops and intelligence in the same organization due to culture clashes. i.e., when you find bad guys, do you arrest them once you have enough evidence for prosecution, or do you run counterintelligence ops, feed them disinformation, and roll up the cell later?
- NCTC is apparently the coordinator for the anti-terrorism part of U.S. strategic communications/public diplomacy. I didn't get to ask him my question of how he thinks Smith-Mundt applies to NCTC (sorry Matt). But they apparently have a whole 15 analysts working on the subject, including one guy named Quintin* who Leiter went on and on about.
Sheehan spent a little time talking about what he called the "Maginot Line" of counterterrorism - stuff like scanning incoming shipping containers for radiation, trying to catch terrorists at border crossings, etc. Sheehan feels the centers of gravity for counterterrorism operations need to be basic intelligence tradecraft, police work, and eliminating the hype so people feel comfortable getting on with life after a terrorist attack. He noted that the Brits were taking the subway in London three hours after the 7/7 attacks, and that Israelis go back to the mall the day after it was hit. This of course requires that uninformed speculation be kept to a minimum.
Update: I believe "Quintin" at NCTC is Quintan Wiktorowicz. I stumbled across an article in the International Review of Social History on using popular intellectuals as a "point of contention" in framing contests in fighting Al Qaeda.
Quintan Wiktorowicz. Framing Jihad: Intramovement Framing Contests and al-Qaeda's Struggle for Sacred Authority. International Review of Social History, Volume 49, Supplement S12, December 2004, pp 159-177.
Investigating Terrorism
Joke:
Reporters Expose Airport Security Lapses By Blowing Up Plane
Not a joke:
Reporters Expose Airport Security Lapses By Blowing Up Plane
Not a joke:
As a terrorism analyst, I am both appalled and confused by many of the post-9/11 articles published at home and abroad, in newspapers, news magazines and academic journals, as well as on the Internet.Pluchinsky (a professor in my program) can only even bring this up as an issue because of the assumption that the operational tempo of terrorist groups is much faster than that of the US government. i.e., that a terrorist group would be able to exploit information published in a NYTimes scoop faster than the government would be able to fix the problem. Yet the only solution ever put forward is to restrict the press....
Many of these articles have clearly identified for terrorist groups the country's vulnerabilities -- including our food supply, electrical grids, chemical plants, trucking industry, ports, borders, airports, special events and cruise ships. Some of these articles have been lengthy and have provided tactical details useful to terrorist groups. No terrorist group that I am aware of has the time and manpower to conduct this type of extensive research on a multitude of potential targets. Our news media, and certain think tankers and academicians, have done and continue to do the target vulnerability research for them.
UN catches on to mobile phones
Via Chris Albon at Human Security Review, we see that the UN is using text messages to inform Iraqi refugees in Syria about food aid:
The United Nations has sent about 10,000 text messages on mobile phones to help inform Iraqi refugees in Syria that an international food distribution program for them begins tomorrow...I wonder how soon it will be before some enterprising terrorist hacks the UN's database of phone numbers, sends out a false pickup time and place, and detonates a car bomb there.
...This is the first large-scale text message campaign to provide information about a humanitarian assistance program, said World Food Program spokesman Khaled Mansouri, speaking in a telephone interview from Cairo. "This is a technology that will be used more and more in the future."
Text messages to mobile phones are one of the most effective ways to communicate with communities of refugees who may not have stable addresses, the UN said.
Irony or lunacy?
Inspired by Glenn Greenwald's examination of the nutcases that want to bomb Iran, Digby digs up an article from 2003 by Michael Ledeen at the National Review. An excerpt:
Of course this would have to be an extremely wide-spread Sokal-conspiracy, involving Douglas MacKinnon as well, who has his own crazy ramblings.
So the French and the Germans struck a deal with radical Islam and with radical Arabs: You go after the United States, and we'll do everything we can to protect you, and we will do everything we can to weaken the Americans.Michael Ledeen is actually taken seriously on by many Republicans and members of the current administration. His grand conspiracy theory is especially ironic, considering today's news:
I continue to hold out hope that people like Ledeen are actually engaged in a long-term punking of the right-wing media (National Review, FrontPageMag, WorldNetDaily, etc.). Perhaps they were inspired by Alan Sokal and are engaged in a long-term project to destroy right-wing credibility on matters of national security.Three suspects allegedly trained in Pakistan by an Al Qaeda-linked group have been arrested for plotting massive car-bomb attacks on US troops and other Americans near US military bases and German airports, authorities said yesterday...
The trio in Germany allegedly planned simultaneous strikes on three soft targets that might have included nightclubs, bars, restaurants, or airports frequented by American soldiers and tourists, according to German and US law enforcement officials. Because the confiscated materials could have produced the equivalent of about 1,000 pounds of TNT, the casualty toll could have far exceeded the transport bombings that killed 52 people in London in 2005 and 191 people in Madrid in 2004, officials said.
Of course this would have to be an extremely wide-spread Sokal-conspiracy, involving Douglas MacKinnon as well, who has his own crazy ramblings.
Knowledge is everywhere...
...and that's scary!
Can Open Source be giving comfort to the enemy? At Chris Anderson's The Long Tail, found via Slashdot.
Chris Anderson is conflicted - he runs a website for makers of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to share their experiences and knowledge. UAVs have clear military applications (like the US's Predator drone), but Chris figured that since the "bad guys" already UAVs, what's the harm in sharing amateur knowledge? And then:
Amir is only 17 years old, reads Chris Anderson's website, and posted his own comment. Here's Amir's website. Most of his posts are in Farsi, but there are some English posts and also some pictures of his homemade UAV (very impressive). I tried to post a comment on Amir's post about the incident, but given that his site is in Farsi I don't really know whether I was successful.
Along the same kind of lines, Steven Levitt describes how he would attack the United States if he was a terrorist. He also wants to hear your ideas on how to create terror attacks:
Can Open Source be giving comfort to the enemy? At Chris Anderson's The Long Tail, found via Slashdot.
Chris Anderson is conflicted - he runs a website for makers of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to share their experiences and knowledge. UAVs have clear military applications (like the US's Predator drone), but Chris figured that since the "bad guys" already UAVs, what's the harm in sharing amateur knowledge? And then:
But all that came to a head today when I read the main UAV newsgroup, and saw that Amir Aalipour, an Iranian in Tehran, had posted some pictures of his swing-wing UAV (shown), proudly bedecked with the colors of the Iranian flag. He's been following the discussion in these forums for some time and now wanted to come forward with his own impressive work.An interesting question. Some websites/software have the "check here if you are a terrorist" box, and don't let you use the software if you are dumb enough to check that box. But on an open-source site like Chris' there's no real way to tell what people are using the technology for unless they tell you. Chris only got uneasy after seeing Amir's UAV painted with the Iranian flag - had Amir not painted his UAV, no problems for Chris.
...what should I do if Amir or someone like him from a country associated with Bad Stuff posts on our own forums looking for technical advice?
Amir is only 17 years old, reads Chris Anderson's website, and posted his own comment. Here's Amir's website. Most of his posts are in Farsi, but there are some English posts and also some pictures of his homemade UAV (very impressive). I tried to post a comment on Amir's post about the incident, but given that his site is in Farsi I don't really know whether I was successful.
Along the same kind of lines, Steven Levitt describes how he would attack the United States if he was a terrorist. He also wants to hear your ideas on how to create terror attacks:
Consider that posting them could be a form of public service: I presume that a lot more folks who oppose and fight terror read this blog than actual terrorists. So by getting these ideas out in the open, it gives terror fighters a chance to consider and plan for these scenarios before they occur.Usually red-teaming is not so public...
The University of Al Qaeda
When I checked Facebook this afternoon, I found an absolutely hilarious post written by my friend and fellow SSP student, Ge Yu. Ge is the first Chinese student in SSP - the first out of 1.3 billion!
Without further ado, here is Ge's essay (reproduced with author's consent).
Without further ado, here is Ge's essay (reproduced with author's consent).
Imagine the Alternative II - Modern Terrorist Training
Now, we know Al Qaeda is very keen on utilizing modern technologies, such as the Internet and Google Earth for training, recruitment and propaganda.
I haven't been to an Afghan Training Camp, but what if life in the camps is just like life in our modern universities.
For example, when you apply for the University of Al Qaeda, do you need to write a Personal Statement and a Resume? :
"Dear Recruitment Sheik: I am solemnly writing to you to apply for the MS Suicide Bombing Program at the UAQ. Being a Suicide Bomber has long been my aspiration. My old sheik used to say, 'ask not what your mosque can do for you, but what you can do for your mosque.' Ever since my father brought those dynamite home from work when I was 5, I have known that this is a career that I would tie my life to. I have many years of experience in terrorism-related activities. Below is a copy of my resume. Thank you for your consideration and may Allah be with you.
1995-1996: Administrative Intern in the Fundamentalist Mosque of Baghdad; 1996-2000: BA on History of Islamic Suffering, the Mohamed School of (Anti)Humanity and Arts, University of Tehran; 2000-2003: Club Manager, the Travel Agency of Bali, Western Tourist Division; 2003-2005: Traffic Supervisor, London Transport Authority; 2005-2007: Research Assistant, Institute of Radiology, National Health Services, UK"
Once they get in, do they have to worry about financial aid and housing? Here may be a conversation between a trainee and a personal adviser:
T: "You see, sir, ever since the US dismantled the Republican Guards, my father has lost his pension. My mother worked as a train driver in Spain but she has just been put on the terrorist watch list and all her assets have been frozen. If there is any grant left in the Bin Laden Foundation Scholarship, I think I should get it."
PA: "I sympathize with your situation, young man. However, as you must know, the Bin Laden Scholarship is highly competitive and all granting decisions are made by a Committee of Jihad Veterans selected by Mr. Bin Laden himself all the way from his personal cave in Afghanistan. Yet, I think I may be able to offer a Federal Funded Work-Study position in our Improvised Explosive Factory. But, remember, this offer is conditional on maintaining a satisfactory academic performance. After all, you are here to be a bomber, not a bomb-maker."
T: "That is great, chemistry used to be my favorite subject in high school. Now, how about housing? Real Estate inside of the Green Zone is too expensive, but if I live outside, I am not sure I can cope with the commute. I can never remember which bus is marked for carrying roadside bombs..."
Once the course started, do they have happy hours and social events?
Student A: "you can't believe how busy I am this week. Apart from a 15 page paper on the Proper Use of Rocket Propelled Grenades, I have to proofread the research proposal by Professor Afshin on Western Infidelism and the Bush Doctrine. And, Friday, I have to fly to Uzbekistan for a conference on the 21st Century Muslin Nationalism in Central Asia. I am just going there for the free food actually... they serve some of the most exquisite Kebabs among all Al Qaeda cells in the East hemisphere."
Student B: "well, are you free over the weekend? I am going to the African Fundamentalist Student Union. They are having a film night, showing Black Hawk Down, followed by a special demonstration of female close quarter combat... I mean, boy, the Somali and Ethiopian chicks are HOT."
Now, do they have exams, office hours and end-of-term evaluations?
Here is an exam question - " Who said this: 'The liberation of Iraq is a crucial advance in the campaign against terror. We've removed an ally of al Qaeda, and cut off a source of terrorist funding. And this much is certain: No terrorist network will gain weapons of mass destruction from the Iraqi regime, because the regime is no more.' Critically evaluate the above statement in the light of what you learned about the US Intelligence Community, extra points will be given to student who can still remember the name of the former US Defense Secretary who messed up the plan to invade Iraq."
During a feedback session: "Your performance in my Introduction to Homemade Fertilizer Truck Bombs was very disappointing, Abdulah. You used the wrong amount of ammonium nitrate and the wrong kind of detonators. However, I, out of sympathy, gave you a C, because you at least know that a bomb needs a detonator, which pulled you from the bottom of the class. Nonetheless, you have let me down, you have let yourself down, but you did manage to blow the school up..."
And here we are, a freshly graduated suicide bomber received his certificate from a Training Camp that uses our style of education. The only problem with the Suicide Bomber Program is that they never seem to be able to build a robust alumni network...
The End - a Yuism Production, Second in the "Imagine the Alternative" Series. All rights reserved and no republication without the author's consent.
Ge Yu
A Review of John Robb's Brave New War
"A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive will not long be safe companions to liberty." - James Madison.
"Please treat [Brave New War] as a buffet table and not a five-course meal. Take what you want of my vision of the future and discard the rest with alacrity." - John Robb, preface to Brave New War.
Brave New War is the book that has evolved out of John Robb's blog, Global Guerrillas.First, I'll go over a brief rundown of what I think Global Guerrillas are. Then, it being July 4th, I'll relate it to American democracy, specifically Madisonian conceptions of democracy. Then I'll look at where Global Guerrillas theory can go from here.
1. Brief overview of Global Guerrilla theory, as I understand it
Global Guerrillas describes a new tactical system in which miniature "armies" based around non-state entities are able to use modern technology to attack states, major corporations, and other symbols of the modern world.
Essentially, Global Guerrillas have taken advantage of the same technology that enabled programs like Assault Breaker, Follow On Forces Attack, and Network Centric Warfare and reapplied it to their own social organization. This technology means that it is easy to break things (states, societies, etc.) and difficult to put them back together. The way I see it, Global Guerrillas combine Effects Based Operations with Mao's old idea of insurgency into a kind of insurgency 2.0 (similar to Web 2.0 in that it is more collaborative than hierarchical). The ease with which new Global Guerrilla organizations arise (low barriers to entry in the Bazaar of Violence) leads to a dynamic called open source warfare.
Robb doesn't go into the motivations of Global Guerrilla armies - nor should he. He's been criticized for not delving into the motivations of these new actors. But, as Soob and Shloky get at, as Global Guerrillas are an organizational framework and a theory about war, not an attempt to explain the motivations of individuals. The motivations of Hitler are not crucial to understanding the development of blitzkrieg.
The predicted rise of Global Guerrillas has strategic implications for the United States. While Global Guerrillas are tactical organizations, the communications environment that helps create them means that tactical operations have strategic consequences (the concept of Strategic Compression). On top of that idea, radically new tactics have always required new strategies - if a new tactic renders the forces you've bought obsolete, you need to buy entirely new forces. Future American strategy is the last couple chapters of Robb's book. Robb compares caricatures of two possible futures - that of a knee-jerk police state and a future with dynamic decentralized resilience. I'll give away the ending - a knee-jerk police state is unable to deal with Global Guerrillas.
2. Global Guerrilla theory and its relationship to Madisonian democracy1
In the time since America has been a Great Power, we have rarely been satisfied with our organizations tasked with national security. In times of crisis we've tried to give our national security organizations more power, and in times of relative calm we've tried to rein them back in. There's a long list of distinguished books that argue for or against various reorganizations – for me, the historiography begins with Ideas and Weapons, by I. B. Holley, about the U.S. security establishment's failure to organize effectively to incorporate airplanes.
There's a progression of centralization of power that starts with the National Security Act of 1947 and continues with the reorganization in 1958, Goldwater Nichols in 1986, the creation of a DHS and DNI, and the proposed “Goldwater-Nichols II.” There has been pushback. Recently, Andrew Bacevich proposed the elimination of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From different perspectives, others (the Church Committee, Cato, other libertarians who are generally seen as crackpots) have argued against centralization of power based on the danger such power can pose to democracy. However those who push back have been swimming against the tide.
That, as much as the terrorism/insurgency context, is the context in which I put John Robb's Brave New War.
Robb argues that in this new era of globalization, the large centralized bureaucracies with anticipatory functions (the same ones that pose dangers to our liberty) will be unable to react to unforeseeable events that disrupt the infrastructure we depend on, whether those events are attacks like 9/11 or natural disasters like Katrina. Instead, he advocates for dynamic decentralized resilience, placing the responsibility for security on small-scale resilient communities connected through open-source networks and platforms, and, crucially, depriving these large-scale organizations of reasons to exist. This model, on the extreme "coordination" end of the spectrum between coordination and centralization, empowers a Madison conception of democracy.
In both Madisonian democracy and in Robb's resilient communities, power is distributed not between the branches of federal government, but is largely devolved to local governments and shared with state and federal agencies. The weakness of this type of organization historically is that it would take forever to get anything done, and in wartime, as Madison himself found out during the War of 1812, centralization can be necessary. For the first time since this country's founding, if John Robb is right, advocates of Madisonian democracy will have an answer to Hamiltonians who have argued that centralizing power in an executive provides for greater security (from outside threats) for the people.
This is not the context in which Robb conceived of his book – I am clearly hijacking Robb's ideas for my own purposes. However I think it fits. The devolution of strategic power2 that Robb believes was necessarily preceded by the devolution of economic power may lead to the devolution of legal power as well, by stripping authority away from an ineffective and clumsy federal government.
3. The ultimate impact of this book
I hope/think that this book will spawn qualitative and quantitative research. Narratively, Global Guerrillas theory makes sense, but to be accepted as a Theory with a capital T, quantitative research needs to confirm GG's various hypotheses. Contrary to Tdaxp, there are crucial elements of Robb's theory that are falsifiable. Here are a few off the top of my head:
Ultimately Brave New War is a easily accessible and coherent narrative of the future that Robb sees for conflict. It is a large cluster of hypotheses that hopefully will prove fertile ground for research. It leaves you wanting more, and hopefully we will soon get it. Robb has mentioned he's in the early stages of a second book “on superempowered individuals and their ability to change things for the better.” I'm looking forward to it.
For other reviews of Brave New War, see Robb's website, Global Guerrillas, or Soob's rundown. Robb also has a second, less formal blog you can read.
Notes
1. This section draws upon a hopefully-soon-to-be-published paper in Defense Horizons - I'll post a link to it when it is published. If people want more information, leave a comment or drop me an email.
2. Robb writes on page 8 that "this threshhold will finally reach its culmination – with the ability of one man to declare war on the world and win.”
"Please treat [Brave New War] as a buffet table and not a five-course meal. Take what you want of my vision of the future and discard the rest with alacrity." - John Robb, preface to Brave New War.
Brave New War is the book that has evolved out of John Robb's blog, Global Guerrillas.First, I'll go over a brief rundown of what I think Global Guerrillas are. Then, it being July 4th, I'll relate it to American democracy, specifically Madisonian conceptions of democracy. Then I'll look at where Global Guerrillas theory can go from here.
1. Brief overview of Global Guerrilla theory, as I understand it
Global Guerrillas describes a new tactical system in which miniature "armies" based around non-state entities are able to use modern technology to attack states, major corporations, and other symbols of the modern world.
Essentially, Global Guerrillas have taken advantage of the same technology that enabled programs like Assault Breaker, Follow On Forces Attack, and Network Centric Warfare and reapplied it to their own social organization. This technology means that it is easy to break things (states, societies, etc.) and difficult to put them back together. The way I see it, Global Guerrillas combine Effects Based Operations with Mao's old idea of insurgency into a kind of insurgency 2.0 (similar to Web 2.0 in that it is more collaborative than hierarchical). The ease with which new Global Guerrilla organizations arise (low barriers to entry in the Bazaar of Violence) leads to a dynamic called open source warfare.
Robb doesn't go into the motivations of Global Guerrilla armies - nor should he. He's been criticized for not delving into the motivations of these new actors. But, as Soob and Shloky get at, as Global Guerrillas are an organizational framework and a theory about war, not an attempt to explain the motivations of individuals. The motivations of Hitler are not crucial to understanding the development of blitzkrieg.
The predicted rise of Global Guerrillas has strategic implications for the United States. While Global Guerrillas are tactical organizations, the communications environment that helps create them means that tactical operations have strategic consequences (the concept of Strategic Compression). On top of that idea, radically new tactics have always required new strategies - if a new tactic renders the forces you've bought obsolete, you need to buy entirely new forces. Future American strategy is the last couple chapters of Robb's book. Robb compares caricatures of two possible futures - that of a knee-jerk police state and a future with dynamic decentralized resilience. I'll give away the ending - a knee-jerk police state is unable to deal with Global Guerrillas.
2. Global Guerrilla theory and its relationship to Madisonian democracy1
In the time since America has been a Great Power, we have rarely been satisfied with our organizations tasked with national security. In times of crisis we've tried to give our national security organizations more power, and in times of relative calm we've tried to rein them back in. There's a long list of distinguished books that argue for or against various reorganizations – for me, the historiography begins with Ideas and Weapons, by I. B. Holley, about the U.S. security establishment's failure to organize effectively to incorporate airplanes.
There's a progression of centralization of power that starts with the National Security Act of 1947 and continues with the reorganization in 1958, Goldwater Nichols in 1986, the creation of a DHS and DNI, and the proposed “Goldwater-Nichols II.” There has been pushback. Recently, Andrew Bacevich proposed the elimination of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From different perspectives, others (the Church Committee, Cato, other libertarians who are generally seen as crackpots) have argued against centralization of power based on the danger such power can pose to democracy. However those who push back have been swimming against the tide.
That, as much as the terrorism/insurgency context, is the context in which I put John Robb's Brave New War.
Robb argues that in this new era of globalization, the large centralized bureaucracies with anticipatory functions (the same ones that pose dangers to our liberty) will be unable to react to unforeseeable events that disrupt the infrastructure we depend on, whether those events are attacks like 9/11 or natural disasters like Katrina. Instead, he advocates for dynamic decentralized resilience, placing the responsibility for security on small-scale resilient communities connected through open-source networks and platforms, and, crucially, depriving these large-scale organizations of reasons to exist. This model, on the extreme "coordination" end of the spectrum between coordination and centralization, empowers a Madison conception of democracy.
In both Madisonian democracy and in Robb's resilient communities, power is distributed not between the branches of federal government, but is largely devolved to local governments and shared with state and federal agencies. The weakness of this type of organization historically is that it would take forever to get anything done, and in wartime, as Madison himself found out during the War of 1812, centralization can be necessary. For the first time since this country's founding, if John Robb is right, advocates of Madisonian democracy will have an answer to Hamiltonians who have argued that centralizing power in an executive provides for greater security (from outside threats) for the people.
This is not the context in which Robb conceived of his book – I am clearly hijacking Robb's ideas for my own purposes. However I think it fits. The devolution of strategic power2 that Robb believes was necessarily preceded by the devolution of economic power may lead to the devolution of legal power as well, by stripping authority away from an ineffective and clumsy federal government.
3. The ultimate impact of this book
I hope/think that this book will spawn qualitative and quantitative research. Narratively, Global Guerrillas theory makes sense, but to be accepted as a Theory with a capital T, quantitative research needs to confirm GG's various hypotheses. Contrary to Tdaxp, there are crucial elements of Robb's theory that are falsifiable. Here are a few off the top of my head:
- You could look at the start-up costs of creating new insurgent groups (similar to evaluating start-up costs for various companies) to test the “open source” hypothesis.
- You could look at funding sources to see if Global Guerrilla armies really are entirely self-sufficient, or whether successful ones are merely proxies for other states.
- You could look at whether levels of state failure rise perceptibly after attacks on so-called "systempunkts" (one possible example of a systempunkt is the Samarra mosque bombing in 2006).
- You could evaluate various non-state centered conflicts to determine the number of different groups fighting - an increasing number would confirm Robb's hypothesis on open source warfare.
Ultimately Brave New War is a easily accessible and coherent narrative of the future that Robb sees for conflict. It is a large cluster of hypotheses that hopefully will prove fertile ground for research. It leaves you wanting more, and hopefully we will soon get it. Robb has mentioned he's in the early stages of a second book “on superempowered individuals and their ability to change things for the better.” I'm looking forward to it.
For other reviews of Brave New War, see Robb's website, Global Guerrillas, or Soob's rundown. Robb also has a second, less formal blog you can read.
Notes
1. This section draws upon a hopefully-soon-to-be-published paper in Defense Horizons - I'll post a link to it when it is published. If people want more information, leave a comment or drop me an email.
2. Robb writes on page 8 that "this threshhold will finally reach its culmination – with the ability of one man to declare war on the world and win.”
Saved by the Patriot Act?
Here's a link to the recent al-Marri decision (pdf), by Judge Diana Gribbon Motz.
For work a couple weeks ago, I read through the recent court decision on Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri. I meant to post about it back then (the decision came down June 11th) but I never got around to it. Better late than never. This is a long post.
The decision is important regarding habeus corpus rights, as well as interpretations of the Military Commissions Act (MCA).
The government had three basic arguments:
1) that the federal courts had no jurisdiction over al-Marri and that al-Marri fell under the MCA;
2) That the Authorization for the Use of Military Force allowed Bush to detain suspects indefinitely; and
3) That the President has, under Article 2 of the Constitution, the power to detain anyone he likes, so long as he relates it to national security.
---------------------------------------
The Government's first argument was that the federal courts had no business deciding this case, as al-Marri's case should go through the special "courts" set up by the MCA. Here's the basic dispute over the MCA:
The court decided it had jurisdiction for two reasons. First of all, prior to al-Marri's suit, no effort had been made to give al-Marri a Combat Status Review Tribunal, and had made no effort to process al-Marri under the MCA. The second reasons was because the MCA was intended to apply only to those detainees who had statutory habeus rights, and al-Marri, being a legal resident of the U.S., has constitutional habeus rights just like any U.S. citizen. Therefore the federal courts had jurisdiction.
---------------------------------------
The next part of the Government's argument was that the President was granted under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), the President was given the authority to declare al-Marri as an enemy combatant, and use the military to indefinitely detain him. "Alternatively, the Government contends that even if the AUMF does not authorize the President to order al-Marri’s military detention, the President has “inherent constitutional power” to do so." (29) It's important to note that this "inherent constitutional power" argument applies to "persons seized and detained within the United States who have constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause" (30 n4), which would include any American citizen sitting in her living room.
Judge Motz sums up the arguments over habeus on page 35:
---------------------------------------
Bush's final argument is that Article 2 of the Constitution gives him the authority to subject anyone - including United States citizens - involved in hostilities against the United States to military detention. This argument, again ironically, is shot down by the Patriot Act.
The "Youngstown test" basically states that the President has the most power when Congress is behind him. In this case, because Congress stated how they wanted people like al-Marri to be treated in the Patriot Act, the President was acting against the wishes of Congress, therefore his power is at its weakest.
What's surprising is that the Patriot Act was written by the Administration. Congress voted in favor of it largely without reading it - the President could (and did, even at the reauthorization) slip anything he want into the bill. Thus the Court is pointing out that the Administration has been inconsistent in how it has tried to treat various classes of detainees, and basically has no coherent legal theory of what it is trying to do.
---------------------------------------
The remainder of the decision is Judge Motz trying to underscore how radical the Government's arguments were. She reminds us that the rights Bush fights to deprive American citizens of are the same rights we fought our War of Independence to restore:
For work a couple weeks ago, I read through the recent court decision on Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri. I meant to post about it back then (the decision came down June 11th) but I never got around to it. Better late than never. This is a long post.
The decision is important regarding habeus corpus rights, as well as interpretations of the Military Commissions Act (MCA).
The government had three basic arguments:
1) that the federal courts had no jurisdiction over al-Marri and that al-Marri fell under the MCA;
2) That the Authorization for the Use of Military Force allowed Bush to detain suspects indefinitely; and
3) That the President has, under Article 2 of the Constitution, the power to detain anyone he likes, so long as he relates it to national security.
---------------------------------------
The Government's first argument was that the federal courts had no business deciding this case, as al-Marri's case should go through the special "courts" set up by the MCA. Here's the basic dispute over the MCA:
The Government asserts that the MCA divests federal courts of all subject matter jurisdiction over al-Marri’s petition. Al-Marri maintains that the MCA, by its plain terms, does not apply to him and that if we were to hold it does, the MCA would be unconstitutional. (13)There are two kinds of habeus rights in the U.S. - constitutional and statutory. Statutory rights are rights that the Congress extends out of the good of its heart to non-residents, non-citizens, or people outside the country. Since al-Marri was legally living in the U.S., he has constitutional habeus rights, not statutory - meaning that the arguments Bush was applying to al-Marri could just as easily apply to any United States citizen. Judge Motz then determined that the MCA was intended to apply to detainees with statutory habeus rights, not constitutional (i.e., the MCA can never be applied to a United States citizen).
The court decided it had jurisdiction for two reasons. First of all, prior to al-Marri's suit, no effort had been made to give al-Marri a Combat Status Review Tribunal, and had made no effort to process al-Marri under the MCA. The second reasons was because the MCA was intended to apply only to those detainees who had statutory habeus rights, and al-Marri, being a legal resident of the U.S., has constitutional habeus rights just like any U.S. citizen. Therefore the federal courts had jurisdiction.
---------------------------------------
The next part of the Government's argument was that the President was granted under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), the President was given the authority to declare al-Marri as an enemy combatant, and use the military to indefinitely detain him. "Alternatively, the Government contends that even if the AUMF does not authorize the President to order al-Marri’s military detention, the President has “inherent constitutional power” to do so." (29) It's important to note that this "inherent constitutional power" argument applies to "persons seized and detained within the United States who have constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause" (30 n4), which would include any American citizen sitting in her living room.
Judge Motz sums up the arguments over habeus on page 35:
The Government principally contends that its evidence establishes this and therefore the AUMF grants the President statutory authority to detain al-Marri as an enemy combatant. Alternatively, the Government asserts that the President has inherent constitutional authority to order al-Marri’s indefinite military detention. Al-Marri maintains that the proffered evidence does not establish that he fits within the “legal category” of enemy combatant and so the AUMF does not authorize the President to order the military to seize and detain him, and that the President has no inherent constitutional authority to order this detention.Ironically, al-Marri is saved from indefinite military detention by that law civil libertarians hate - the USA PATRIOT Act. Basically, al-Marri's classification under the Patriot Act shows that he falls under some kind of law (the Patriot Act allows detention up to six months, but not indefinitely), which is better than being subject to no laws, as the Government was arguing:
The explicit authorization for limited detention and criminal process in civilian courts in the Patriot Act provides still another reason why we cannot assume that Congress silently empowered the President in the AUMF to order the indefinite military detention without any criminal process of civilian “terrorist aliens” as “enemy combatants.” (61-62)So, the courts shot down Bush's argument that the AUMF allows him to use the military domestically to detain people.
---------------------------------------
Bush's final argument is that Article 2 of the Constitution gives him the authority to subject anyone - including United States citizens - involved in hostilities against the United States to military detention. This argument, again ironically, is shot down by the Patriot Act.
The "Youngstown test" basically states that the President has the most power when Congress is behind him. In this case, because Congress stated how they wanted people like al-Marri to be treated in the Patriot Act, the President was acting against the wishes of Congress, therefore his power is at its weakest.
What's surprising is that the Patriot Act was written by the Administration. Congress voted in favor of it largely without reading it - the President could (and did, even at the reauthorization) slip anything he want into the bill. Thus the Court is pointing out that the Administration has been inconsistent in how it has tried to treat various classes of detainees, and basically has no coherent legal theory of what it is trying to do.
---------------------------------------
The remainder of the decision is Judge Motz trying to underscore how radical the Government's arguments were. She reminds us that the rights Bush fights to deprive American citizens of are the same rights we fought our War of Independence to restore:
In the Declaration of Independence our forefathers lodged the complaint that the King of Great Britain had “affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power” and objected that the King had “depriv[ed] us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury.” (72)She ends the decision by warning that, given Bush's disrespect for the law, our constitutional form of government could end (76-77).
For the President does not acknowledge that the extraordinary power he seeks would result in the suspension of even one law and he does not contend that this power should be limited to dire emergencies that threaten the nation. Rather, he maintains that the authority to order the military to seize and detain certain civilians is an inherent power of the Presidency, which he and his successors may exercise as they please. To sanction such presidential authority to order the military to seize and indefinitely detain civilians, even if the President calls them “enemy combatants,” would have disastrous consequences for the Constitution -- and the country. For a court to uphold a claim to such extraordinary power would do more than render lifeless the Suspension Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the rights to criminal process in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments; it would effectively undermine all of the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. It is that power -- were a court to recognize it -- that could lead all our laws “to go unexecuted, and the government itself to go to pieces.” We refuse to recognize a claim to power that would so alter the constitutional foundations of our Republic.
Thoughts on the decision to fund the Iraq war
After the most recent Iraq funding vote (House roll call, Senate roll call), I was pretty pissed that Congress had backed down to President Bush. I, like many others who wanted to end our military involvement in Iraq, was of the opinion that Congress should have passed the same bill over and over to force the President to sign it. I thought backing down showed that Congress was spineless. As I've thought about it more, I've changed my mind.
Essentially passing the bill over and over again would be an endurance contest with the President. I came up with a clever metaphor to describe how I thought this would play out: it would be like playing chicken with a suicide car-bomber. Bush is undeterrable and has no problem with using the United States military as political hostages. He believes that he is right on this issue and there is absolutely nothing that will be able to convince him otherwise. Meanwhile, every time the bill is re-passed by Congress, more and more members of Congress and the Senate would be peeled off by the Whitehouse, and we would have ended up with a bill without benchmarks anyway.
In the end I guess I am OK with the Democrats who voted against the bill on principle, knowing it would probably pass anyway, yet I also agree with the Congressmen and Senators who voted for the bill so we didn't have to go through this process ten times, leading to the same result.
Congressman Joe Sestak (D-PA), who voted for the bill without benchmarks, explains his vote:
Essentially passing the bill over and over again would be an endurance contest with the President. I came up with a clever metaphor to describe how I thought this would play out: it would be like playing chicken with a suicide car-bomber. Bush is undeterrable and has no problem with using the United States military as political hostages. He believes that he is right on this issue and there is absolutely nothing that will be able to convince him otherwise. Meanwhile, every time the bill is re-passed by Congress, more and more members of Congress and the Senate would be peeled off by the Whitehouse, and we would have ended up with a bill without benchmarks anyway.
In the end I guess I am OK with the Democrats who voted against the bill on principle, knowing it would probably pass anyway, yet I also agree with the Congressmen and Senators who voted for the bill so we didn't have to go through this process ten times, leading to the same result.
Congressman Joe Sestak (D-PA), who voted for the bill without benchmarks, explains his vote:
We are presently taking money from the gas, etc, of those troops training in America and using that money until it runs out in July for troops in Iraq (by law, you cannot shift money between procurement accounts into money to operate and provide supplies to our troops; there are legal firewalls preventing that). It took us 6 months to redeploy from Somalia safely after Black Hawk Down. With alot more troops (140,000) and thousands of US civilians, it will take at least that long to safely come out via the roads or by limited flights from Iraq. There was no back room deal. This is one purely where we would would run out in July of the resources needed to protect our troops. There would be more causualties than one might imagine, if we tried, in the next 40 days, to get everyone out.
That is why I have been persistent that a date certain (my bill says 31 december) with sufficient time, is not only the right strategy to leave behind an unfailed state, but is also one to protect those we, America, sent to war, while doing so. Even if we all disagree with that war. I will never, ever, play chicken with the sons and daughters of America, and put them in greater danger by voting for a bill that gives them no funds to protect themselves in the next 5-7 weeks. I understand if you disagree, but these are Americans we sent in harms way, and I will never vote to make them less safe as I work to redeploy them in a timely and safe manner.
Thoughts on the JFK plot
A few thoughts on the JFK plot:
- On the spectrum from "entirely homegrown" to "entirely foreign," this seems to be somewhere in the middle. They were naturalized citizens and had to travel back to Guyana and Trinidad to get money and support. However the plot was conceived while Defreitas was working at JFK and living in NYC. So - was JFK a target of opportunity? Or a symbolic target? Or an economic target? Probably all three.
- Defreitas & co. felt like global jihad was being monopolized by Arab Muslims (page 8). Might part of their motivation have been to claim recognition as non-Arab Muslim mujahideen? Apparently the Trinidadian group they tried to get funding from, Jamaat al Muslimeen, has roots in an Afro-Trinidadian (as opposed to West Indians) ideology that evolved from pan-African nationalism (Jamestown).
- The JFK airport was targeted because of its symbolism:
"Anytime you hit Kennedy, it is the most hurtful thing to the United States… If you hit that, this whole country will be in mourning. It's like you can kill the man twice." (page 18)
But it would not be a symbolic target like the Pentagon, White House, Capitol, etc., because it is a functional target as well as a symbolic target. This might mean that an aim as important as the symbolism would be economic disruption (which Defreitas rambles about elsewhere). They targeted a key node in our transportation network, and their attack would have had cascading second and third-order effects (I haven't even started Robb's book yet and I'm already a true believer™!). - The profiles of Russell Defreitas and his co-conspirators do not mesh well with the general profile of successful terrorist leaders, who tend to be educated and middle class. He was homeless for periods of time and no education is listed in his profile. Instead, his case better matches the profile of the individual disconnected with society who turns to violence to find meaning:
These forms of violence are not generated by religion, but in the absence of political ideologies, the actors involved take religious themes to construct meaning.
The actors construct themselves as generic, abstract Muslims, disconnected from cultures and living traditions. Their abstraction and disconnection make them global people.
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