Showing posts with label COIN. Show all posts
Showing posts with label COIN. Show all posts
Abu Muqawama
It's old news now that Abu Muqawama, A.K.A. Andrew Exum, has retired from blogging (temporarily I'm sure). What I hadn't noticed, due to reading Abu Muqawama via Google Reader, was that the Abu Muqawama comment section may be in the process of jumping the shark. A couple months ago you had great comment threads like this one. Now you have a 90 comment thread where anonymous trolls yell "defeatocrat" at each other. "I RED DUG FEITHS BOOK AND HE SEZ UR WRONG!@!!!1" I imagine the blog's remaining authors are too busy with their actual jobs to monitor the comment threads, although Dr. iRack smacks a few fools down in that last link.
Looking at insurgencies, and data selection
Via Zenpundit, I came across a good article in Armed Forces Journal by Capt. Robert Chamberlain that looks at the faulty idea that insurgencies/counterinsurgencies always take a long time:
When academics study insurgencies en masse, they create databases full of very bloody, long insurgencies that kill lots of people but ignore the many many more small, short-lived insurgencies. Consequently our understanding of insurgency as a mode of conflict is skewed towards large bloody messes. I'd hazard a guess that this problem doesn't have the same degree of impact in studying conventional wars, because conventional wars are easier to find in the historical record, and usually the combatants are states that wield significant combat power, meaning there aren't as many kitchen fires that don't turn into five-alarm blazes.
The problem of data selection is cemented in the Correlates of War database. This database is a one-stop shop for researchers on war, but it only counts conflicts that result in more than one thousand battle deaths. Some sort of filter like that is necessary or else the data set would be too large to be useful. The problem comes when researchers like Paul Collier take the COW data, look at intra-state conflict and extrapolate their findings to all intra-state conflict ever, instead of just intra-state conflict with more than 1000 battle deaths.
Using COW data, Collier and Hoeffler reached the conclusion that rebellions happen when there exist opportunities for rebellion (rather than grievances for rebellion). Had they thought about the limitations of their data, they would have realized that their argument only showed that rebellions survive to create conflicts large enough to appear on COW's radar when the opportunity exists for large rebellions - and that rebellions driven by grievances might occur in hostile environments for rebellion but would be wiped out quickly, like the 1963 rebellion by the Kel Adagh.
Dan Byman, the head of my old program, said something related in a talk a couple months ago. He noted that a lot of people argue that terrorism doesn't kill large numbers of people. Byman argued that's only true because when terrorism does start to kill lots of people, we don't call it terrorism any more. Exhibit A, the firebombings of Germany and Tokyo. Exhibit B, the 1990s civil war in Algeria. Exhibit C, the situation in Iraq.
This whole problem is similar to Taleb's idea of "silent evidence" - in order to understand big house fires, you have to look at the big fires themselves, as well as small fires that don't become big fires. Only then can you really understand what factors are important in turning small fires into big ones (click the link to see that even Harvard professors do not understand this concept).
The point of Chamberlain's article was that the mantra that 'counterinsurgency campaigns take a long time' has been used as an excuse for the failure to provide a coherent strategy for a favorable outcome in Iraq and Afghanistan:
It is simply untrue that counterinsurgencies are inherently long-term struggles.When I started studying the Tuareg insurgencies in Mali and Niger, I was surprised to learn that there had been an insurgency in 1963-1964 in Mali. I had never heard of it, because it hadn't killed very many people. One Tuareg clan - the Kel Adagh, based near Kidal, Mali - rebelled against the Malian government and were brutally crushed in short order. As I wrote in my thesis:
The Malian Army crushed the Kel Adagh rebellion by using widespread violence against civilians, torture, declaring the countryside outside of a few towns a vast free-fire zone, poisoning wells necessary for any activity outside towns, killing Tuareg herds of cattle and camels to force them into the cities, executing the religious and political leaders of both rebel and neutral clans, and threatening napalm bombing from fighter-bombers.In Chamberlain's metaphor, this was a "kitchen fire" rather than a five-alarm blaze, and because it did not reach 1000 battle deaths, the 1963 rebellion does not appear in the main intra-state war database, Correlates of War (COW).
When academics study insurgencies en masse, they create databases full of very bloody, long insurgencies that kill lots of people but ignore the many many more small, short-lived insurgencies. Consequently our understanding of insurgency as a mode of conflict is skewed towards large bloody messes. I'd hazard a guess that this problem doesn't have the same degree of impact in studying conventional wars, because conventional wars are easier to find in the historical record, and usually the combatants are states that wield significant combat power, meaning there aren't as many kitchen fires that don't turn into five-alarm blazes.
The problem of data selection is cemented in the Correlates of War database. This database is a one-stop shop for researchers on war, but it only counts conflicts that result in more than one thousand battle deaths. Some sort of filter like that is necessary or else the data set would be too large to be useful. The problem comes when researchers like Paul Collier take the COW data, look at intra-state conflict and extrapolate their findings to all intra-state conflict ever, instead of just intra-state conflict with more than 1000 battle deaths.
Using COW data, Collier and Hoeffler reached the conclusion that rebellions happen when there exist opportunities for rebellion (rather than grievances for rebellion). Had they thought about the limitations of their data, they would have realized that their argument only showed that rebellions survive to create conflicts large enough to appear on COW's radar when the opportunity exists for large rebellions - and that rebellions driven by grievances might occur in hostile environments for rebellion but would be wiped out quickly, like the 1963 rebellion by the Kel Adagh.
Dan Byman, the head of my old program, said something related in a talk a couple months ago. He noted that a lot of people argue that terrorism doesn't kill large numbers of people. Byman argued that's only true because when terrorism does start to kill lots of people, we don't call it terrorism any more. Exhibit A, the firebombings of Germany and Tokyo. Exhibit B, the 1990s civil war in Algeria. Exhibit C, the situation in Iraq.
This whole problem is similar to Taleb's idea of "silent evidence" - in order to understand big house fires, you have to look at the big fires themselves, as well as small fires that don't become big fires. Only then can you really understand what factors are important in turning small fires into big ones (click the link to see that even Harvard professors do not understand this concept).
The point of Chamberlain's article was that the mantra that 'counterinsurgency campaigns take a long time' has been used as an excuse for the failure to provide a coherent strategy for a favorable outcome in Iraq and Afghanistan:
According to conventional wisdom, we will be in Iraq and Afghanistan for at least 10 years because they are insurgencies, and that’s how long insurgencies take...Fabius Maximus continues this point by arguing that when an insurgency has carried on long enough and is damaging enough for a country to beg for large-scale American military involvement, that country is probably doomed to lose anyway. A more effective counterinsurgency strategy for the United States would focus on the small "kitchen fires", and try to keep those kitchen fires from becoming big fires, rather than reacting late to put out big fires.
This is an abdication of the responsibilities of strategic leadership. The American public is owed more of an explanation than, “Well, these things take a while.” It is owed a comprehensive strategic vision...
Jumble of stuff
Below the cut are a bunch of cool stuff I've come across, most of which I would dedicate full posts to if I had the time.
Here is something that really ticks me off. People in the media, like Cokie Roberts in this video, and David Brooks in the New York Times, justify asking candidates stupid and inane questions because, according to Cokie, "these are the kinds of questions that will come up in the general election." Notice the use of the passive voice there. Do the questions ask themselves? Will a bush burst into flames and a booming voice ask Senator Obama "WHERE IS YOUR FLAG LAPEL PIN?" Cokie Roberts uses the passive voice to hide the fact that the media is the one that decides the questions will arise in the general campaign. If she was honest, what she would say is "we are justified in asking dumb questions in the primary, because we plan on asking dumb questions in the general election too." Paul Waldman makes the same point at the Prospect.
Some guy in prison in Texas is going to be on the ballot in Idaho's Democratic presidential primary, just by paying $1000 and taking advantage of stupid officials.
Here are some awesome pictures courtesy of the EPA's photo contest for Earth Day.
Via Kevin Drum, apparently there is a newer new left, made up of:
This Congressional Quarterly story by Jeff Stein is, according to Google News, literally THE ONLY story on the ongoing Italian trial of twenty-six American CIA agents for kidnapping (here's the Wikipedia article on it). The only thing more amazing than the story itself is the total lack of interest from the American press.
Andrew Exum writes in the Guardian on the difference between McCain, Clinton and Obama on defense, and specifically on how they view counterinsurgency. More Iraq and Afghanistan veterans have contributed to Obama than either McCain or Hillary.
This is a ten minute video, courtesy of Ghosts of Alexander, that perfectly highlights what Kalyvas calls the core/periphery cleavage in civil war. Two villages are on opposite sides of the Taliban/Government split, not necessarily because of ideology, but because they've had a historic rivalry. The microfoundations of conflict.
Here is something that really ticks me off. People in the media, like Cokie Roberts in this video, and David Brooks in the New York Times, justify asking candidates stupid and inane questions because, according to Cokie, "these are the kinds of questions that will come up in the general election." Notice the use of the passive voice there. Do the questions ask themselves? Will a bush burst into flames and a booming voice ask Senator Obama "WHERE IS YOUR FLAG LAPEL PIN?" Cokie Roberts uses the passive voice to hide the fact that the media is the one that decides the questions will arise in the general campaign. If she was honest, what she would say is "we are justified in asking dumb questions in the primary, because we plan on asking dumb questions in the general election too." Paul Waldman makes the same point at the Prospect.
Some guy in prison in Texas is going to be on the ballot in Idaho's Democratic presidential primary, just by paying $1000 and taking advantage of stupid officials.
Here are some awesome pictures courtesy of the EPA's photo contest for Earth Day.
Via Kevin Drum, apparently there is a newer new left, made up of:
...about a new breed of liberal writers who have emerged on the web—a network of writers who are bringing together reformism and idealism in a way we haven't seen in many years. I'm thinking of people like Joshua Micah Marshall (the man behind Talking Points Memo); Eric Alterman, the Nation columnist, author of many books, and blogger for Media Matters for America; Ezra Klein (The American Prospect); Kevin Drum (the Washington Monthly); Glenn Greenwald (Salon); Matthew Yglesias (the Atlantic); Bob Somerby (the Daily Howler); Rick Perlstein (the Campaign for America's Future); and the writer who goes by the name of Digby who blogs for her own website, digbysblog.
This Congressional Quarterly story by Jeff Stein is, according to Google News, literally THE ONLY story on the ongoing Italian trial of twenty-six American CIA agents for kidnapping (here's the Wikipedia article on it). The only thing more amazing than the story itself is the total lack of interest from the American press.
Andrew Exum writes in the Guardian on the difference between McCain, Clinton and Obama on defense, and specifically on how they view counterinsurgency. More Iraq and Afghanistan veterans have contributed to Obama than either McCain or Hillary.
This is a ten minute video, courtesy of Ghosts of Alexander, that perfectly highlights what Kalyvas calls the core/periphery cleavage in civil war. Two villages are on opposite sides of the Taliban/Government split, not necessarily because of ideology, but because they've had a historic rivalry. The microfoundations of conflict.
Updating the blogroll
I've added a few new blogs to the blogroll - here are some good posts you should check out if you have time.
Some guy "Rob" has a new blog Rob's Arabic Media Shack. Rob highlights interesting bits and provides summaries for the non-Arabic speakers among us, especially things that aren't covered in the U.S. press. Any blog that disses American media's foreign coverage as much as his does, I'm sure to like. He has good posts like:
Ghosts of Alexander is billed as Afghanistanica's replacement (which has unfortunately shut down). It's also new, with only three posts so far. It's first post is very good: A Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan.
Paul McCleary is a reporter for the Columbia Journalism Review and is currently reporting from Iraq on his blog War, the military, COIN and stuff. His posts are in depth and very good, for instance, this post The Sunni and the Shia are like the Tigris and the Euphrates, looking at how American soldiers are stuck trying to make sure the Iraqi Police, the Iraqi Army, and their new allies in the Sunni Awakening don't all kill each other.
Some guy "Rob" has a new blog Rob's Arabic Media Shack. Rob highlights interesting bits and provides summaries for the non-Arabic speakers among us, especially things that aren't covered in the U.S. press. Any blog that disses American media's foreign coverage as much as his does, I'm sure to like. He has good posts like:
Israel-Hezbullah II (wouldn't it be III?)The Insurgency Research Group blog is also new and so far has highlighted interesting COIN-related stuff from around the web. It's written by a couple academics in King's College, London.
Zawahiri vs. Sayyid Imam
US-Muslim Brotherhood Rapprochement?
Funding for Middle East Related Think Tanks
Ghosts of Alexander is billed as Afghanistanica's replacement (which has unfortunately shut down). It's also new, with only three posts so far. It's first post is very good: A Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan.
Paul McCleary is a reporter for the Columbia Journalism Review and is currently reporting from Iraq on his blog War, the military, COIN and stuff. His posts are in depth and very good, for instance, this post The Sunni and the Shia are like the Tigris and the Euphrates, looking at how American soldiers are stuck trying to make sure the Iraqi Police, the Iraqi Army, and their new allies in the Sunni Awakening don't all kill each other.
Bombing our way to 'victory' in Iraq
As part of Operation Phantom Phoenix in Iraq, the US is stepping up its use of air power.
NYTimes:
Airpower --> collateral damage --> pissed off Iraqis --> creating more insurgents --> bad counterinsurgency practice. Airpower in terms of dropping bombs didn't work for the Israelis in Lebanon in the summer of 2006, and it hasn't worked for the US in Iraq or Afghanistan.
"No, we don't use airstrikes because we don't have enough troops. We use airstrikes because they're in our repertoire."
Check out this Abu Muqawama post on airpower in counterinsurgency if you are interested.
Also on Iraq, this piece by Brian Katulis and classmate Peter Juul on "Four Ticking Time Bombs" in regards to Iraq:
NYTimes:
American bombers and fighter aircraft dropped 40,000 pounds of bombs on suspected militant hide-outs, storehouses and defensive positions in the southern outskirts of Baghdad on Thursday, the United States military said.38 bombings in 10 minutes in Baghdad alone. Operation Phantom Phoenix is nationwide, so I'd assume many more air operations throughout the country, especially in Miqdadiyah (in Diyala province) and Samarra (source). That is a bad thing.
In one of the largest airstrikes in recent months, two B-1 and four F-16 aircraft dropped 38 bombs within 10 minutes near the Latifiya district south of Baghdad, the military said. The airstrikes were accompanied by a large Iraqi and American ground assault.
Airpower --> collateral damage --> pissed off Iraqis --> creating more insurgents --> bad counterinsurgency practice. Airpower in terms of dropping bombs didn't work for the Israelis in Lebanon in the summer of 2006, and it hasn't worked for the US in Iraq or Afghanistan.
"No, we don't use airstrikes because we don't have enough troops. We use airstrikes because they're in our repertoire."
Check out this Abu Muqawama post on airpower in counterinsurgency if you are interested.
Also on Iraq, this piece by Brian Katulis and classmate Peter Juul on "Four Ticking Time Bombs" in regards to Iraq:
- The collapse of “bottom up” reconciliation among Sunnis
- Increased instability in northern Iraq
- The continuing plight of refugees and internally displaced Iraqis
- Continued deadlock among Iraq’s national political leaders
Request for Info on Tuareg Rebellion
I'm back in DC for my last semester, when I have to write my thesis. I'm thinking about writing on the Tuareg rebellion(s) in Mali and Niger. For background on the conflict, this Reuters article is a good source.
It seems a pretty good potential case study, as similar rebellions have taken different courses in the two countries, plus there is the role of environmental change and desertification as a driver of conflict, and U.S. involvement through the Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Partnership. The problem is that most of the material on the rebellions is in French, which I don't speak or read. There doesn't seem to be much stuff on the military situation in English other than occasional news articles. I'll have plenty of material on the Tuareg themselves thanks to my mom and her contacts (she is an expert in African art). I think I'll have plenty of information on U.S. involvement as well - I just need information on the rebellion itself - military aspects, who's involved, countermeasures, any journal articles on it, etc.
I found a few useful links:
Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali, by Lieutenant Colonel Kalifa Keita.
The site tuaregs.online.fr, with chronologies of the Tuareg rebellion of the 1990s in Mali and Niger, as well as other cultural information on the Tuareg.
An American University ICE (Inventory of Conflict and Environment) case study titled The Tuareg in Mali and Niger: The Role of Desertification in Violent Conflict.
Some IRIN (UN agency) articles on the resumption of violence in Niger and allegations of atrocities.
There's some information on the ICG's website, on Niger and Mali.
Tiemoko Diallo seems to be covering the conflict for Reuters.
There was a slight news bump on the Tuareg back in September when they fired at an American plane, but Western news articles have little information other than the basic facts about the insurgency.
The Tuareg rock band Tinariwen has a chronology of the conflict on their site.
There is also the website for the Mouvement des Nigeriens pour la Justice, unfortunately only in French, as well as the Alliance Touaregue Niger-Mali, which I assume is another rebel group.
If anyone finds more stuff, please email it to me or leave it as a comment!
I'll be updating this post as I come across more stuff.
A Resurgent Tuareg Insurgency? Neil Thompson
Making Sense of the New Tuareg Rebellion, David Zounmenou
Tuareg rebellion in Niger - lots of photos
A drugs-smuggling connection? Articles on possible connections between Tuaregs and cocaine smuggling at the Taipei Times.
It appears that contacting the NMJ or similar groups will be difficult - two French journalists were arrested for trying to do so and may be executed. Perhaps in Mali it might be easier.
The Niger Movement for Justice posted a yearly assessment of their activities on their blog, from their leader He celebrates the defection of some Nigerien soldiers to the NMJ, and an alliance between the NMJ and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Sahara, a group that kidnapped a couple Italian tourists in 2006. He also promises better discipline to stop civilian casualties, and declares against uranium mining.
StockInterview.com has a couple pieces on the Tuareg rebellion, focusing on the uranium question.
Jeremy Keenan is an expert on the Tuareg and has also written on US counterterrorism policies in the Sahara region.
Fake Terror and Instability in North Africa by Sam Urquhart - challenges the notion that there is a terrorism threat in North Africa, or at least that there was before U.S. involvement.
A blog called the Head Heeb has some posts on the Tuareg rebellion. The latest one is from May 18th.
Another piece related to the uranium mining: Niger rebels pressure uranium miners, by James Finch
Another piece from April 10 2006 on uranium mining in Niger doesn't mention the conflict, and is unintentionally funny.
From Reuters, INTERVIEW-W.Africa is crime, terrorism "black hole"-UN expert
Human Rights Watch has documented atrocities on both sides in Niger. Amnesty International is alarmed at Nigerien Army's killing of civilians. The Nigerien Association for the Defence of Human Rights has condemned government killings (via Factiva). The Nigerien Army disagrees, but admits that it has killed civilians (Factiva).
Omar Ansari and Slimane Chenine are apparent experts on the Tuareg situation (Factiva).
Endangered Peoples of Africa and the Middle East - has a chapter by Susan Rasmussen on the Tuareg.
Art of Being Tuareg - interesting book.
Tuareg nomads set to intensify rebellion in Niger, Christian Science Monitor, Tristan McConnell
How Tuaregs, Hausas are avoiding another Darfur, CSM, Tristan McConnell - about how Tuareg are fighting desertification
Africa's Unfolding Desert War, ISA Consulting, Dulue Mbachu
Famine not Fanaticism the Real Enemy in West Africa
Thanks goes to New Yorker in DC for helping me figure out how to put most of this post behind a cut!
Stratfor has two pieces related to the conflict - Mali: Rising Tensions and Interests in the Sahel, and Niger: Rebels, Resources and the Niger Delta Parallel.
BBC - Secrets in the Sand, Part 1 and Part 2 - audio program.
West Africa leaders plan Sahara security conference - in part to deal with the Tuareg rebellions in Niger and Mali. AFP article also.
BBC - Tuareg rebels abduct town's mayor
Summary of Baz Lecocq's thesis on the Tuareg. I emailed Mr. Lecocq for a copy but unfortunately he is out of copies. Baz Lecocq has also written many other papers on the Tuareg, including "The War on Terror in a Haze of Dust: Potholes and Pitfalls on the Saharan Front", by Baz Lecocq and Paul Schrijver, in the Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 25, 1, Jan. 2007. From that same issue, David Gutelius' paper "Islam in Northern Mali and the War on
Terror" is also very good.
Other scholarly articles include ICG's "Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel, Fact or Fiction?"
I am trying to get a handle on the relationship between the Tuareg and the GSPC.
Articles which reference antagonistic relationships:
Algeria Watch, Mali Tuaregs say Algerian militant killed in clash
Reuters, Algerian Militans Ambush Malian Tuaregs, Kill 9
Articles that reference cooperative relationships:
An article on Winds of Change - seems like speculation though.
Mokhtar Belmokhtar is the GSPC leader that supposedly has Tuareg links - he has married Tuareg women for political reasons, but I'm not sure whether that gains him support or just being left alone.
I posted an RFI at the PMC discussion group.
Ethnic Conflict and Regions of Wealth in North Africa - Dar Al Hayat opinion piece, Nov 23 2007.
www.niger1.com has lots of good coverage, pulling articles from various sources that I'd otherwise miss (thanks to a poster at PMCs discussion group).
The Tuareg Culture and News blog is a goldmine of information.
The local websites Temoust and Kidal.info have good coverage, and Kidal.info has an English forum.
It seems a pretty good potential case study, as similar rebellions have taken different courses in the two countries, plus there is the role of environmental change and desertification as a driver of conflict, and U.S. involvement through the Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Partnership. The problem is that most of the material on the rebellions is in French, which I don't speak or read. There doesn't seem to be much stuff on the military situation in English other than occasional news articles. I'll have plenty of material on the Tuareg themselves thanks to my mom and her contacts (she is an expert in African art). I think I'll have plenty of information on U.S. involvement as well - I just need information on the rebellion itself - military aspects, who's involved, countermeasures, any journal articles on it, etc.
I found a few useful links:
Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali, by Lieutenant Colonel Kalifa Keita.
The site tuaregs.online.fr, with chronologies of the Tuareg rebellion of the 1990s in Mali and Niger, as well as other cultural information on the Tuareg.
An American University ICE (Inventory of Conflict and Environment) case study titled The Tuareg in Mali and Niger: The Role of Desertification in Violent Conflict.
Some IRIN (UN agency) articles on the resumption of violence in Niger and allegations of atrocities.
There's some information on the ICG's website, on Niger and Mali.
Tiemoko Diallo seems to be covering the conflict for Reuters.
There was a slight news bump on the Tuareg back in September when they fired at an American plane, but Western news articles have little information other than the basic facts about the insurgency.
The Tuareg rock band Tinariwen has a chronology of the conflict on their site.
There is also the website for the Mouvement des Nigeriens pour la Justice, unfortunately only in French, as well as the Alliance Touaregue Niger-Mali, which I assume is another rebel group.
If anyone finds more stuff, please email it to me or leave it as a comment!
I'll be updating this post as I come across more stuff.
A Resurgent Tuareg Insurgency? Neil Thompson
Making Sense of the New Tuareg Rebellion, David Zounmenou
Tuareg rebellion in Niger - lots of photos
A drugs-smuggling connection? Articles on possible connections between Tuaregs and cocaine smuggling at the Taipei Times.
It appears that contacting the NMJ or similar groups will be difficult - two French journalists were arrested for trying to do so and may be executed. Perhaps in Mali it might be easier.
The Niger Movement for Justice posted a yearly assessment of their activities on their blog, from their leader He celebrates the defection of some Nigerien soldiers to the NMJ, and an alliance between the NMJ and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Sahara, a group that kidnapped a couple Italian tourists in 2006. He also promises better discipline to stop civilian casualties, and declares against uranium mining.
StockInterview.com has a couple pieces on the Tuareg rebellion, focusing on the uranium question.
Jeremy Keenan is an expert on the Tuareg and has also written on US counterterrorism policies in the Sahara region.
Fake Terror and Instability in North Africa by Sam Urquhart - challenges the notion that there is a terrorism threat in North Africa, or at least that there was before U.S. involvement.
A blog called the Head Heeb has some posts on the Tuareg rebellion. The latest one is from May 18th.
Another piece related to the uranium mining: Niger rebels pressure uranium miners, by James Finch
Another piece from April 10 2006 on uranium mining in Niger doesn't mention the conflict, and is unintentionally funny.
"We were concerned with any political situations, but both North and Kreczmer assured us the country is stable. “When I first went to Niger in November 2004, and that was during the last election, it honestly looked like a lot of fun... My experience with Niger is that it’s a peaceful, democratic country with no civil unrest. Let’s put it this way. They have less civil unrest than France."Blogger Bouba has a few posts on the Tuareg, including a petition for Tuareg independence, an interview (unfortunately for me in French) and a video of the music group Tinariwen.
From Reuters, INTERVIEW-W.Africa is crime, terrorism "black hole"-UN expert
[Antonio Mazzitelli] cited indications that armed rebellions by Tuareg desert fighters in northern Niger and Mali, ostensibly launched on political grounds, were actually a front for large-scale trafficking of drugs and arms.Tuareg Insurgency Spreads to Niger's Capital, by Nana Adu Ampofo, at Global Insight Daily Analysis (via Factiva):
See other stories here. Journalists have been targeted by the Nigerien government - I wouldn't be surprised if MNJ is correct and the government killed a journalist and blamed it on MNJ.With the death of journalist Abdou "Jeannot" Mahamane, the Tuareg insurgency raging in northern Niger since February 2007 appears to have spread to the capital, Niamey, for the first time. Mahamane was killed by a landmine Tuesday (8 January) evening. Quoted by Agence France-Presse (AFP), government spokesperson Mohamed Ben Omar has attributed the attack to the Movement for Justice in Niger (MNJ), which has led the violent campaign in Agadez province, ostensibly for Tuareg rights. The MNJ has denied responsibility for the Niamey mines and counters on its Web site that the attribution is a government effort to turn public opinion against it. A second, unexploded mine has been found in the area by the authorities.Significance: The international non-governmental organisation (NGO) Human Rights Watch (HRW) recently criticised the MNJ for conducting an indiscriminate land mine campaign in northern Niger.
An estimated 80 people have been killed or injured since February 2007 by land mines in the troubled region, a third of them civilians, HRW reports. The government was also criticised for targeting the civilian population. However, despite the length of the conflict and the apparent ineffectiveness of the exclusively military government response, there has been little change in strategy on either side. Until recently Nigerien president Mamadou Tandja would only refer to the MNJ as bandits. Tandja still refuses to recognise any legitimate basis for negotiation with the MNJ and has referred to MNJ activities as terrorism. That being the case, Global Insight expects to see the conflict continue through 2008.
Human Rights Watch has documented atrocities on both sides in Niger. Amnesty International is alarmed at Nigerien Army's killing of civilians. The Nigerien Association for the Defence of Human Rights has condemned government killings (via Factiva). The Nigerien Army disagrees, but admits that it has killed civilians (Factiva).
Omar Ansari and Slimane Chenine are apparent experts on the Tuareg situation (Factiva).
Endangered Peoples of Africa and the Middle East - has a chapter by Susan Rasmussen on the Tuareg.
Art of Being Tuareg - interesting book.
Tuareg nomads set to intensify rebellion in Niger, Christian Science Monitor, Tristan McConnell
How Tuaregs, Hausas are avoiding another Darfur, CSM, Tristan McConnell - about how Tuareg are fighting desertification
Africa's Unfolding Desert War, ISA Consulting, Dulue Mbachu
Famine not Fanaticism the Real Enemy in West Africa
Thanks goes to New Yorker in DC for helping me figure out how to put most of this post behind a cut!
Stratfor has two pieces related to the conflict - Mali: Rising Tensions and Interests in the Sahel, and Niger: Rebels, Resources and the Niger Delta Parallel.
BBC - Secrets in the Sand, Part 1 and Part 2 - audio program.
West Africa leaders plan Sahara security conference - in part to deal with the Tuareg rebellions in Niger and Mali. AFP article also.
BBC - Tuareg rebels abduct town's mayor
Tuareg rebels in Niger have attacked a town killing or abducting several people in the biggest raid in recent months.
...
The West African regional body Ecowas is increasingly concerned and is to hold a summit soon to tackle the issue.
They will also consider a smaller rebellion in neighbouring Mali.
Summary of Baz Lecocq's thesis on the Tuareg. I emailed Mr. Lecocq for a copy but unfortunately he is out of copies. Baz Lecocq has also written many other papers on the Tuareg, including "The War on Terror in a Haze of Dust: Potholes and Pitfalls on the Saharan Front", by Baz Lecocq and Paul Schrijver, in the Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 25, 1, Jan. 2007. From that same issue, David Gutelius' paper "Islam in Northern Mali and the War on
Terror" is also very good.
Other scholarly articles include ICG's "Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel, Fact or Fiction?"
I am trying to get a handle on the relationship between the Tuareg and the GSPC.
Articles which reference antagonistic relationships:
Algeria Watch, Mali Tuaregs say Algerian militant killed in clash
Reuters, Algerian Militans Ambush Malian Tuaregs, Kill 9
Articles that reference cooperative relationships:
An article on Winds of Change - seems like speculation though.
Mokhtar Belmokhtar is the GSPC leader that supposedly has Tuareg links - he has married Tuareg women for political reasons, but I'm not sure whether that gains him support or just being left alone.
I posted an RFI at the PMC discussion group.
Ethnic Conflict and Regions of Wealth in North Africa - Dar Al Hayat opinion piece, Nov 23 2007.
www.niger1.com has lots of good coverage, pulling articles from various sources that I'd otherwise miss (thanks to a poster at PMCs discussion group).
The Tuareg Culture and News blog is a goldmine of information.
The local websites Temoust and Kidal.info have good coverage, and Kidal.info has an English forum.
Looking at the Surge
With the withdrawal of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry this month, the first of the "Surge" brigades has returned from Iraq. This marks the beginning of the end of the Surge. So far, has the Surge been a success?
To answer this question, I'm going to compare the cost incurred by the Surge compared to the benefits of it. I'll try to disaggregate the recent positive trends (emphasis on trends - the overall rates of violence, etc. are still horrific) in Iraq from the effects of the Surge itself.
Costs
Costs fall in three categories - money, lives, and opportunity. It's difficult to estimate the monetary costs of sending five extra brigades to Iraq (the Surge). The Pentagon throws all sorts of junk in with their "emergency" funding requests for Iraq and Afghanistan, meaning it'd be extremely tedious to go through the text of their requests to see how much is budgeted for operations pre-Surge and post-Surge. The White House's estimate was $5.6 billion, while the GAO estimated that the costs will be "up to $27 billion" for the Surge (CNN).
It's impossible to measure the cost in terms of U.S. lives. The Surge has put more U.S. personnel in Iraq as targets for insurgents and terrorists, and U.S. casualties were the highest in early 2007 (the beginning of the Surge) as they ever were. However more brigades means Coalition military power can be concentrated in problem areas like Diyala. For my purposes I'll call the "lives" cost a wash.
In terms of opportunity costs, sending our last five brigades to Iraq means that we have no brigades in reserve. If something unexpected happens in the rest of the world - for example if North Korea crosses the DMZ - we'll be able to send no reinforcements. Of course this only matters if something like that happens- fairly unlikely, but of course the whole point we have an expeditionary military capability in the first place. Our lack of reserves also means we're unable to send troops to troubled spots like Darfur that need resources only Western militaries can provide, although it's unlikely we'd send troops there anyway.
Results?
Over the course of the Surge, trends in Iraq have gone from entirely negative to mixed. According to DoD, violence against civilians is down to February 2006 levels (before the bombing of the Samarra mosque), while violence against Coalition targets is down to summer 2005 levels. These improvements are not entirely due to the Surge (and again I'll stress that the levels of violence are down to a time back when Iraq was widely considered to be in a civil war).
The decrease in violence is due to a number of converging factors. First of all, the Surge convinced many insurgent groups to lay low to wait out the temporary increase in American forces. When the additional U.S. forces leave, as they have already started doing, these insurgent groups may pick up their weapons again. Second, Jaysh al Mahdi (the militia loyal to Moqtada al Sadr) imposed a truce on itself after they massacred religious pilgrims in Karbala. Third, the U.S. forces' change in tactics from an enemy-centric strategy (i.e., where your focus is on killing bad guys) to a population-centric strategy (where your focus is on getting the local population on your side) would have resulted in lowering civilian deaths without a Surge (although may have raised American casualty levels in the short term). Fourth, ethnic cleansing operations in Baghdad and elsewhere have passed their peak as many neighborhoods are totally cleansed.
Finally and most important, the Anbar Awakening hit full force in Anbar province, coinciding with the Surge. The Awakening movement, now spreading across Iraq (but not without resistance from the central government), allowed the U.S. military to coopt the tribal forces that were allowing Al Qaeda in Iraq to target Americans in Anbar province. The U.S. thus eliminated an enemy and were able to assist local tribes eliminate an Al Qaeda safehaven in Anbar, lowering violence rates against both U.S. troops and civilians. I assume the Surge, giving extra units to Anbar, made the task of rolling up Al Qaeda cells in Anbar quicker, but that same effect likely could have been accomplished by transferring units from quieter parts of Iraq anyway.
Judgment
Thus of the positive trends in Iraq, none of them have really been due to the Surge in American troop levels. In addition, the Surge has accomplished nothing politically in Baghdad - the Iraqi government in Baghdad remains as irrelevant as it ever has been. The Surge's original logic - to improve the security situation in Baghdad to give the central government the "breathing space" necessary to accomplish political reconciliation - has been a total failure, as the central government hasn't accomplished anything in months.
The Surge cost the U.S. billions of dollars and risked (and still risks) leaving the U.S. totally unprepared for contingencies around the world. In exchange we got little or nothing. While some insurgent groups may have decided to lay low during the period of increased American troops, that merely displaces current violence into the future, while those groups use the time to regroup, retrain and rearm.
Bush's Surge policy is/was a failure. Only the skill of a new leadership team in Iraq, the completion of Iraqi ethnic cleansing operations, and liberal amounts of luck have prevented the Surge's failure from being obvious. Instead, lazy journalists (and hacks) attribute the positive (and probably temporary) trends in Iraq to the Surge, giving Republicans (like McCain) political cover for failed policies. Credit, instead, should go to the mid-level officers who helped facilitate the tactical alliances with Sunni tribes in Al-Anbar, to people like Abu Risha and Abul Abed of Amariyah (a nutcase, but OUR nutcase), who took it upon themselves to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq, and to Lady Luck, the best ally of any military.
To answer this question, I'm going to compare the cost incurred by the Surge compared to the benefits of it. I'll try to disaggregate the recent positive trends (emphasis on trends - the overall rates of violence, etc. are still horrific) in Iraq from the effects of the Surge itself.
Costs
Costs fall in three categories - money, lives, and opportunity. It's difficult to estimate the monetary costs of sending five extra brigades to Iraq (the Surge). The Pentagon throws all sorts of junk in with their "emergency" funding requests for Iraq and Afghanistan, meaning it'd be extremely tedious to go through the text of their requests to see how much is budgeted for operations pre-Surge and post-Surge. The White House's estimate was $5.6 billion, while the GAO estimated that the costs will be "up to $27 billion" for the Surge (CNN).
It's impossible to measure the cost in terms of U.S. lives. The Surge has put more U.S. personnel in Iraq as targets for insurgents and terrorists, and U.S. casualties were the highest in early 2007 (the beginning of the Surge) as they ever were. However more brigades means Coalition military power can be concentrated in problem areas like Diyala. For my purposes I'll call the "lives" cost a wash.
In terms of opportunity costs, sending our last five brigades to Iraq means that we have no brigades in reserve. If something unexpected happens in the rest of the world - for example if North Korea crosses the DMZ - we'll be able to send no reinforcements. Of course this only matters if something like that happens- fairly unlikely, but of course the whole point we have an expeditionary military capability in the first place. Our lack of reserves also means we're unable to send troops to troubled spots like Darfur that need resources only Western militaries can provide, although it's unlikely we'd send troops there anyway.
Results?
Over the course of the Surge, trends in Iraq have gone from entirely negative to mixed. According to DoD, violence against civilians is down to February 2006 levels (before the bombing of the Samarra mosque), while violence against Coalition targets is down to summer 2005 levels. These improvements are not entirely due to the Surge (and again I'll stress that the levels of violence are down to a time back when Iraq was widely considered to be in a civil war).
The decrease in violence is due to a number of converging factors. First of all, the Surge convinced many insurgent groups to lay low to wait out the temporary increase in American forces. When the additional U.S. forces leave, as they have already started doing, these insurgent groups may pick up their weapons again. Second, Jaysh al Mahdi (the militia loyal to Moqtada al Sadr) imposed a truce on itself after they massacred religious pilgrims in Karbala. Third, the U.S. forces' change in tactics from an enemy-centric strategy (i.e., where your focus is on killing bad guys) to a population-centric strategy (where your focus is on getting the local population on your side) would have resulted in lowering civilian deaths without a Surge (although may have raised American casualty levels in the short term). Fourth, ethnic cleansing operations in Baghdad and elsewhere have passed their peak as many neighborhoods are totally cleansed.
Finally and most important, the Anbar Awakening hit full force in Anbar province, coinciding with the Surge. The Awakening movement, now spreading across Iraq (but not without resistance from the central government), allowed the U.S. military to coopt the tribal forces that were allowing Al Qaeda in Iraq to target Americans in Anbar province. The U.S. thus eliminated an enemy and were able to assist local tribes eliminate an Al Qaeda safehaven in Anbar, lowering violence rates against both U.S. troops and civilians. I assume the Surge, giving extra units to Anbar, made the task of rolling up Al Qaeda cells in Anbar quicker, but that same effect likely could have been accomplished by transferring units from quieter parts of Iraq anyway.
Judgment
Thus of the positive trends in Iraq, none of them have really been due to the Surge in American troop levels. In addition, the Surge has accomplished nothing politically in Baghdad - the Iraqi government in Baghdad remains as irrelevant as it ever has been. The Surge's original logic - to improve the security situation in Baghdad to give the central government the "breathing space" necessary to accomplish political reconciliation - has been a total failure, as the central government hasn't accomplished anything in months.
The Surge cost the U.S. billions of dollars and risked (and still risks) leaving the U.S. totally unprepared for contingencies around the world. In exchange we got little or nothing. While some insurgent groups may have decided to lay low during the period of increased American troops, that merely displaces current violence into the future, while those groups use the time to regroup, retrain and rearm.
Bush's Surge policy is/was a failure. Only the skill of a new leadership team in Iraq, the completion of Iraqi ethnic cleansing operations, and liberal amounts of luck have prevented the Surge's failure from being obvious. Instead, lazy journalists (and hacks) attribute the positive (and probably temporary) trends in Iraq to the Surge, giving Republicans (like McCain) political cover for failed policies. Credit, instead, should go to the mid-level officers who helped facilitate the tactical alliances with Sunni tribes in Al-Anbar, to people like Abu Risha and Abul Abed of Amariyah (a nutcase, but OUR nutcase), who took it upon themselves to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq, and to Lady Luck, the best ally of any military.
Challenging the new COIN doctrine
LtC Gian Gentile (who I mentioned earlier here) has an article challenging FM 3-24, also known as General Petraeus' counterinsurgency doctrine. It's started some spirited discussion, in which LtC Gian Gentile has taken part, at the Small Wars Journal forum. I found the thread when I noticed a bunch of hits all coming from a referral at SWJ. Apparently my two earlier posts mentioning LtC Gian Gentile are number two and three on Google. No idea how that happened.
Reinventing the Wheel
The New York Times website has a story called "You Win This War by Drinking Tea", on a book from 1943 guiding American servicemen who were deployed to Iraq on how to behave and interact with Iraqis (full text, 27 page pdf). A friend of mine sent me a link to this book a couple months ago but I forgot to write about it. From flipping through it, I would say it's a lot more useful than the index-sized "smart cards" soldiers get when they are headed to Iraq. The story also has part of an NPR interview with LtC John Nagl:
Max Boot wrote a book (which I haven't read) about the numerous American involvements in "small wars" like insurgencies, police actions, peace keeping, etc. These wars are preserved in American culture in anecdotal ways like the Marine Corps hymn ("to the shores of Tripoli" refers to the 1801-1805 war between the United States and the Barbary pirates). However it seems that American war-fighting knowledge has to keep re-learning how to do these small wars, a point LtC Nagl raises in his book "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife." Apparently the American military can only remember one thing at a time - given that, I suppose it's good that they prepared for the unlikely but catastrophic event (war with the USSR) and therefore prevented its happening.
If the military can only handle one task, it is further ammunition for Tom Barnett's idea - completely split the military in two (analagous to the Department of War and the Department of the Navy before they were unified in 1947) and have one part do big wars and one part do small wars.
"NORRIS: In the foreword to the book, you write it’s almost impossible, when reading this guide, not to slap oneself on the forehead in despair, that the Army knew so much of Arabic culture and customs 60 years ago.
Lt. Col. NAGL: One really wishes that we’d have this book in our breast pockets when we arrived in Iraq in September of 2003. We learned on the ground things about Ramadan, for instance, and customs and courtesies during Ramadan the - that this book had, and that were sitting on a library shelf somewhere that I would’ve given my eye and teeth for to have had, well, when I actually really needed it."
Max Boot wrote a book (which I haven't read) about the numerous American involvements in "small wars" like insurgencies, police actions, peace keeping, etc. These wars are preserved in American culture in anecdotal ways like the Marine Corps hymn ("to the shores of Tripoli" refers to the 1801-1805 war between the United States and the Barbary pirates). However it seems that American war-fighting knowledge has to keep re-learning how to do these small wars, a point LtC Nagl raises in his book "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife." Apparently the American military can only remember one thing at a time - given that, I suppose it's good that they prepared for the unlikely but catastrophic event (war with the USSR) and therefore prevented its happening.
If the military can only handle one task, it is further ammunition for Tom Barnett's idea - completely split the military in two (analagous to the Department of War and the Department of the Navy before they were unified in 1947) and have one part do big wars and one part do small wars.
Counterinsurgency metrics
I went to this event at the Heritage Foundation this morning, titled "When Do You Know You're Winning? Combating Insurgencies - Past, Present, and Future." You can watch video or listen to the mp3 of it yourself if you want to - everything was on the record. A few thoughts:
The "keynote speaker," Representative Thaddeus McCotter, Republican from Michigan, made the brilliant point that Iraq IS in fact the central front in the War on Terror, by showing a map of the Middle East, with Iraq in the middle of it. He then stated that "retreat" from Iraq would lead to Iranian revolutionary ideology dominating Iraq, and then Afghanistan, and then Pakistan - the dominoes would start to fall. He feels that the American effort in Iraq was failing between 2003-2006 because it was a "top-down" strategy, and now that General Petraeus is working with grassroots organization with a "bottom-up" approach, we will succeed. I can only assume that Representative McCotter will be calling for alliances with al-Sadr's Mahdi militia, a true grassroots organization, during his next address to Congress. McCotter ended with some Q & A - one person asked about Turkey, and his response was, "Turkey is screwed, too bad - they should have helped us out with the initial invasion, but they didn't, so I couldn't care less."
Dr. Stewart and Dr. Crane both talked about metrics in Vietnam and both were pretty interesting. They didn't quite agree but both stated their cases well. However the truly alarming thing was LTC Gian Gentile's presentation. LTC Gentile commanded a battalion in Baghdad up until a few weeks ago and is now a professor at West Point. He gave a rundown of the metrics he used. I'll list them in the order he presented them, which according to him is the order of importance:
LTC Gentile did say some useful things however - he pointed out that the situation can't be measured by quantifiable variables, and that gut feeling and judgment are the overriding variables, and that progress should be presented in a narrative form rather than through graphs, etc. (although some graphs are useful, especially these graphs). However I was left with a fair amount of questions:
Do the insurgencies use the inverse of our metrics? Or do they use different measures of success? I would expect the latter - that their metrics would be more focused on the political situation in Iraq.
Should there be separate measures - one for internal use, and one for public diplomacy towards the local population?
If the primary metric is the commander's gut feeling, wouldn't you run into problems, as many commanders are insulated from the actual situation on the ground and believe they are doing a good job?
If it takes time to develop metrics based on local conditions, aren't counterinsurgency practitioners more likely to pick metrics that show they are succeeding, or orient their counterinsurgency methods around things they can more easily measure?
Can commanders effectively evaluate their own performance? How do you balance the very granular nature of counterinsurgency, with very different local geographies, with the need for independent outside evaluation?
The "keynote speaker," Representative Thaddeus McCotter, Republican from Michigan, made the brilliant point that Iraq IS in fact the central front in the War on Terror, by showing a map of the Middle East, with Iraq in the middle of it. He then stated that "retreat" from Iraq would lead to Iranian revolutionary ideology dominating Iraq, and then Afghanistan, and then Pakistan - the dominoes would start to fall. He feels that the American effort in Iraq was failing between 2003-2006 because it was a "top-down" strategy, and now that General Petraeus is working with grassroots organization with a "bottom-up" approach, we will succeed. I can only assume that Representative McCotter will be calling for alliances with al-Sadr's Mahdi militia, a true grassroots organization, during his next address to Congress. McCotter ended with some Q & A - one person asked about Turkey, and his response was, "Turkey is screwed, too bad - they should have helped us out with the initial invasion, but they didn't, so I couldn't care less."
Dr. Stewart and Dr. Crane both talked about metrics in Vietnam and both were pretty interesting. They didn't quite agree but both stated their cases well. However the truly alarming thing was LTC Gian Gentile's presentation. LTC Gentile commanded a battalion in Baghdad up until a few weeks ago and is now a professor at West Point. He gave a rundown of the metrics he used. I'll list them in the order he presented them, which according to him is the order of importance:
Security:These seem to be great metrics if your first priority is leaving Iraq with as many soldiers as possible, with little regard to the situation you are leaving to the guys relieving you. It is conducive to holing up in your Forward Operating Base and leaving only to react to events. There is no mention of the local political situation that the security situation is supposed to be oriented around. Furthermore he has as "metrics" things which aren't even nominally under his control, such as the makeup of Iraqi units and the willingness of Sunnis to travel in other commanders' Areas of Responsibility. His emphasis on body count as his primary metric was especially depressing - supposedly we had learned that was a poor metric back in Vietnam (and probably earlier).
Body count (which he acknowledged as "backwards" but justified by referencing some Eliot Cohen article in 2006 that argued "counterinsurgency is still war, and war's essential element is fighting")
Number of times he is attacked (he wants it to be as low as possible)
Number of dead bodies found on the street
Sectarian makeup of Iraqi units he's partnered with
Number of local tips he gets
Number of enemy captured
Governance:
Opening shops on the main street
Keeping useful local leaders alive
"Normal" activity of people
Willingness of Sunnis to travel across Baghdad
Essential services, employment levels
LTC Gentile did say some useful things however - he pointed out that the situation can't be measured by quantifiable variables, and that gut feeling and judgment are the overriding variables, and that progress should be presented in a narrative form rather than through graphs, etc. (although some graphs are useful, especially these graphs). However I was left with a fair amount of questions:
Do the insurgencies use the inverse of our metrics? Or do they use different measures of success? I would expect the latter - that their metrics would be more focused on the political situation in Iraq.
Should there be separate measures - one for internal use, and one for public diplomacy towards the local population?
If the primary metric is the commander's gut feeling, wouldn't you run into problems, as many commanders are insulated from the actual situation on the ground and believe they are doing a good job?
If it takes time to develop metrics based on local conditions, aren't counterinsurgency practitioners more likely to pick metrics that show they are succeeding, or orient their counterinsurgency methods around things they can more easily measure?
Can commanders effectively evaluate their own performance? How do you balance the very granular nature of counterinsurgency, with very different local geographies, with the need for independent outside evaluation?
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