Showing posts with label World War Two. Show all posts
Showing posts with label World War Two. Show all posts

Weather Intelligence

Apparently there is actually an abbreviation for weather intelligence - "Wx."

One of the things I love about blogging is the level playing field. I get to engage life-long professionals in politics and national security as, if not equals, at least something like possible-future-equals. I get a bit of a thrill when an established blogger notices me (the weakness of the human ego). One example of this that is the first-ever comment on my blog (which is still quite young) was from Nicholas Gvosdev, the editor of the National Interest. More recently, the intelligence blog "Kent's Imperative" (a riff on Kant's Imperative and Sherman Kent) noticed my post on the National Intelligence Estimate on Climate Change. Woo, validation! Kent's Imperative categorizes the climate change NIE as weather intelligence.

Probably the most fascinating example of weather intelligence is during the Normandy landings. The weather patterns in the Atlantic and Western Europe were generally unfavorable to landings, because the Allies needed the light of the full moon as well as clear skies in order for their aircraft to find their drop zones, as well as for the tide to be at its highest possible point. This confluence was rare. The weather patterns in that region meant that weather moved from the Atlantic eastwards to France. Allied domination of the seas meant that they would have advance warning of the weather, compared to the Germans who didn't know what was beyond the horizon from the French coastline.

The days before the June landings were cloudy and unfavorable for an amphibious assault in France. The Germans assumed that this weather would continue for the next several days, and thus the Germans assumed that the Allies would be unable to attack for several days and lowered their readiness. Rommel took the occasion to visit his wife in Germany for her birthday, and many division commanders, etc were also away. The Allies, however, knew that there was a gap in the clouds that would arrive on June 6, and thus they executed their attack on June 6. The Allies' superiority in Wx gave them a direct decision advantage over the Germans that they were able to leverage by achieving total surprise (or as close as they could have achieved in the broader picture).

It seems to me that weather intelligence is not easily classified into HUMINT, GEOINT, MASINT, OSINT, or any of the other stovepipes. If Wx was collected by individuals on the ground ("Brr I'm cold"), it would be HUMINT. If Wx was collected via satellite, it might be GEOINT, if it was collected by measuring barometric pressure, it might be MASINT, or if it was collected by reading the newspaper's weather forecasts, it would be open source intelligence. Given these requirements, as well as that Wx would only really be useful to a limited set of consumers (soldiers on the ground, pilots, or people trying to predict environmental disasters) Wx must be a massive headache to manage. The IC apparently decided it would fit in the Air Force, in the Air Force Weather Agency, although that agency is only ten years old.

That's another great thing about blogs (and the interblag in general) - it can get me off on tangents, and I end up learning by accident.

If only we could all shut up, like World War Two

War ain't going so well? Baghdad Bill says "Clap harder!"

Glenn Greenwald was on Alan Colmes' radio show yesterday along with Frank Gaffney. Frank Gaffney wrote an op-ed in the Washington Times that was based on an entirely fabricated Abraham Lincoln quotation about how Congressmen shouldn't question their President during wartime. Podcasts of Alan Colmes' show are available here in parts one, two and three.

In part two, Jeff from Evansville Indiana said "Had we had done this in World War Two, you'd be speaking German now and you'd probably be in [unintelligible]."

Frank Gaffney replied "I think Jeff's absolutely right, that's the kind of accountability I think people ought to be held to."

Apparently there is this myth that nobody criticized the government in World War Two. In fact we had an election in 1944 in which Thomas Dewey "campaigned vigorously" against FDR, accusing him of abusing his authority as President and questioned FDR's fitness to be President.

There was also extensive debate over FDR's prosecution of the war in general. Senator ALbert B. Chandler of Kentucky, William Randolph Hearst, and Charles Lindberg all believed that the United States should not have gotten involved in the European theatre for a variety of reasons. Chandler thought the danger of Japan forcing China out of the war was an even greater danger than that of Germany forcing the Soviet Union out. Lindbergh on the other hand was isolationist, claiming "The three most important groups who have been pressing this country toward war are the British, the Jewish and the Roosevelt administration."

Opponents of the "Europe First" strategy (designed to knock out Germany first, as it posed an immediate existential threat to the UK and USSR) organized as the "America First Committee." According to Wikipedia its membership included Lindbergh, Gerald Ford, Sargent Shriver, Potter Stewart (future Supreme Court justice), the chairman of Sears, Roebuck and Co., Sinclair Lewis, e. e. cummings, and Gore Vidal. On the Senate Floor, Senator Chandler and Senator Arthur Vandenberg from Michigan publicly criticized FDR's strategy Europe First strategy in 1943, and probably many others did as well (I'm working from some sources I collected for a paper in undergrad and kept around on my computer. See the end of my post for a list of them.)

Another interesting twist in comparing World War Two to the current conflict is looking at who was calling for self-censorship when. In the current conflict, The Nation has repeatedly criticized people like Frank Gaffney and Bill Kristol who call for silencing dissent: examples here, here, here, here, and I'm sure there are many other examples. However, in 1943, The Nation wrote that while the final responsibility for determining the amount of forces to commit to each theater of war rests with the President, “he may justly ask that its weight be not increased by irresponsible propaganda either in Congress or the press.” (Planes for the Pacific. The Nation, APril 24, 1943, pages 579-580.) Contrast this to Arthur Krock of the New York Times, who wrote that the press "was being barred by armed American soldiers from that access to the sources of legitimate news which is the custom of democracy and the guaranteed privilege of responsible journalism." (Arthur Krock. "Strategy Senate Issue." New York Times, May 19th, 1943, page 4.) Of course others in the Times called the debate "reckless" and "irresponsible." (Callender, Harold. “Churchill Takes Part in a Congress Debate.” New York Times, May 23rd, 1943, page E3.)

So basically, the next time somebody spouts the old "In World War Two, everybody got on board! If Howard Dean was around in World War Two, we'd all be speaking German!" shtick, please shoot them down. It is a false and dangerous narrative.

I'll leave you with visual proof of domestic dissent in World War Two. Cecil Jensen, a cartoonist for the Chicago Daily News, explicitly criticizes the Europe First strategy by showing an Allied soldier chasing after Hitler while giving merely a passing glance to a bomb with a lit fuse, labeled "Japs" (the caricaturization is pretty racist, but it was 1943, even Bugs Bunny was racist). The cartoon was published in the New York Times on May 23rd, 1943.

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Sources:

Callender, Harold. “Churchill Takes Part in a Congress Debate.” New York Times, May 23rd, 1943, page E3.

“Debate on Strategy.” New York Times, May 19th, 1943, page 24.

Krock, Arthur. “Strategy Senate Issue.” New York Times, May 19th, 1943, page 4.

“Planes for the Pacific.” The Nation, April 24, 1943, pages 579-580.

“Senate Debates ‘Beat Japan’ Cry.” New York Times, May 18th, 1943, page 5.

Steele, Richard W. “Franklin D. Roosevelt and His Foreign Policy Critics.” Political Science Quarterly, Volume 74, Number 1, 1979, pages 15-32.

Trussell, C. P. “Congress Pleased by Churchill Talk.” New York Times, May 20th, 1943, page 3.