Jose Mourinho and Chelsea Football Club have "agreed to part company by mutual consent." The club owner, Roman Abromovich, wanted a European title, and Mourinho's Chelsea got to the semi-finals twice in three years, but never further. Mourinho wanted more control over the team, control Abromovich was unwilling to cede.
---------------------------------------------------
In other soccer news, we see the classic English sense of fair play. Leicester and Nottingham Forest were playing in the League Cup when Leicester's Colin Clarke suffered heart failure. Forest agreed to abandon the game at half time, when Forest was leading 1-0. In the replay, Leicester allowed Forest to score from kickoff, in order to even everything up. Leicester ended up winning 3-2.
Reminds me of the 1935 friendly between England and Nazi Germany. England won 3-0, but the papers the following day were more proud that the game was playing in a sporting spirit, with headlines like "Three Goals and Not One Foul."
Challenging the new COIN doctrine
LtC Gian Gentile (who I mentioned earlier here) has an article challenging FM 3-24, also known as General Petraeus' counterinsurgency doctrine. It's started some spirited discussion, in which LtC Gian Gentile has taken part, at the Small Wars Journal forum. I found the thread when I noticed a bunch of hits all coming from a referral at SWJ. Apparently my two earlier posts mentioning LtC Gian Gentile are number two and three on Google. No idea how that happened.
Interesting reads
Two from Wes Clark: first, his article in the Washington Post's Outlook section on The Next War:
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An article from Der Spiegel on climate refugees - Tuvalu may be the first country in the world to entirely disappear as a result of climate change.
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Boston Globe - The Nonbelievers
Vanity Fair - Going After Gore
A very interesting after-action report on the press coverage of the Gore campaign. It describes a cycle in which Gore received disproportionately unfavorable coverage, which caused him to restrict access to the press, which caused more unfavorable coverage, etc. Gore also dumbed down his message because he felt reporters were too stupid to understand what he was talking about (arguably true):
The Economist - Does independence beckon?
Article on the prospects for official independence for Kurdistan. The way I see it, the status quo is great for Kurdistan, and any attempt to formalize what they have now would jeopardize everything.
-------------------------------------------------
Enterprise Management Resilience Blog - Explaining Development-in-a-Box
Steve DeAngelides explains in detail his company's conception of practical aid to developing regions.
...the next war is always looming, and so is the urgent question of whether the U.S. military can adapt in time to win it.Also, yesterday Clark officially endorsed Hillary Clinton for President. Clark's been close to the Clinton family since the Kosovo war, and I interpret his endorsement as a signal that he'd definitely be involved in a Clinton cabinet, or possibly as a running mate.
Today, the most likely next conflict will be with Iran...
...But if it's clear how a war with Iran would start, it's far less clear how it would end.
...The next war could also come from somewhere unexpected; if you'd told most Americans in August 2001 that the United States would be invading Afghanistan within weeks, they'd have called you crazy.
...the lesson from Iraq and Afghanistan couldn't be more clear: Don't ever, ever go to war unless you can describe and create a more desirable end state. And doing so takes a whole lot more than just the use of force.
...The best war is the one that doesn't have to be fought, and the best military is the one capable and versatile enough to deter the next war in the first place.
-------------------------------------------------
An article from Der Spiegel on climate refugees - Tuvalu may be the first country in the world to entirely disappear as a result of climate change.
"Is it supposed to become a virtual country?" asked Rainer Lagoni, Professor of Maritime Law at the University of Hamburg. There is no legal definition for a country entirely without land.Climate intelligence would certainly be a priority for countries in the South Pacific...
-------------------------------------------------
Boston Globe - The Nonbelievers
In a world where zealots crash planes into buildings in the name of God and politicians use the Bible to craft public policy, Epstein sees himself as in the vanguard of an emerging movement fueled by the rise of skepticism, advances in science and technology, and a spreading aversion toward radical religious ideologies and traditions. He and other humanists, who also call themselves atheists, agnostics, freethinkers, secularists, or brights, point to a survey... which found that 20 percent of Americans between the ages of 18 and 25 say they have no religious affiliation or consider themselves atheists or agnostics – nearly double those who said that in a similar survey 20 years ago.-------------------------------------------------
Vanity Fair - Going After Gore
A very interesting after-action report on the press coverage of the Gore campaign. It describes a cycle in which Gore received disproportionately unfavorable coverage, which caused him to restrict access to the press, which caused more unfavorable coverage, etc. Gore also dumbed down his message because he felt reporters were too stupid to understand what he was talking about (arguably true):
Gore: You're reduced to saying, 'Today, here's the message: reduce pollution,' and not necessarily by XYZ out of fear that it will be, well, 'Today he talked about belching cows!'"-------------------------------------------------
The Economist - Does independence beckon?
Article on the prospects for official independence for Kurdistan. The way I see it, the status quo is great for Kurdistan, and any attempt to formalize what they have now would jeopardize everything.
-------------------------------------------------
Enterprise Management Resilience Blog - Explaining Development-in-a-Box
Steve DeAngelides explains in detail his company's conception of practical aid to developing regions.
Revs beat Denilson
The Revolution's Jekyll & Hyde season continued by defeating FC Dallas 4-2 at home. They looked good down the left wing with Khano Smith having a great game, but still looked frail at the back. Dallas signing Denilson didn't have much of an impact - good for the Revs but perhaps bad for the league, trying to hype its new foreign big-name players. Here are the highlights:
Abu Risha update
Ahmed Abu Risha, Sattar Abu Risha's brother, has succeeded the assassinated sheikh as head of the Anbar Salvation Council.
Al Qaeda in Iraq has claimed responsibility for the assassination.
Boston Globe article.
Al Qaeda in Iraq has claimed responsibility for the assassination.
Boston Globe article.
Athletic Espionage
US sports pages have been abuzz with news that Bill Belichick and the New England Patriots used a videocamera to clandestinely videotape the signals (SIGINT) being sent from Jets coach Eric Mangini to his team. Belichick was fined $500,000 and the Patriots were fined $250,000 plus draft picks, conditional on their performance in the season.
On the other side of the pond, a Formula One racing team (I don't follow Formula One at all but happened across the story at random) was fined $100 million for using technical data from Ferrari about Ferrari cars to improve McLaren cars. Apparently a Ferrari team employee gave the data to a McLaren team (HUMINT).
Ouch.
On the other side of the pond, a Formula One racing team (I don't follow Formula One at all but happened across the story at random) was fined $100 million for using technical data from Ferrari about Ferrari cars to improve McLaren cars. Apparently a Ferrari team employee gave the data to a McLaren team (HUMINT).
Ouch.
Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha, killed
This morning I watched an Al Jazeera program (parts one, two) on the Anbar Awakening that interviewed Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha, the supposed 'unifier' of various Sunni Arab tribes in Al-Anbar. Abu Risha seemed like a pretty shady character, and he made some extraordinary claims, like he was the head of all Arab tribes in Iraq. He also dared the 'terrorists' to attack him when he returned to Iraq (he was spending time in Jordan and Dubai). It was his own version of "bring it on".
General Petraeus immediately blamed the assassination on Al Qaeda. The news articles don't mention any claim of responsibility, and I don't see why the assassination couldn't have been the result of an old-fashioned power struggle.
Now the Washington Post and BBC are reporting that he was assassinated by a roadside bomb. This continues the trend of anyone who might conceivably play any role in Iraqi political reconciliation (although I doubt Abu Risha would have played any helpful role in that) being assassinated, or intimidated into fleeing Iraq.
What will happen to the Anbar Awakening, now that its progenitor has been killed? Will there be a succession struggle for the largess that the US military has showered on Abu Risha? Probably. Supposedly the actual head of the Anbar Awakening is Sheikh Sittar ar Rishawi, so now we can see whether Abu Risha was just a braggart or whether he actually played an important role.
Update: Marc Lynch (Abu Aardvark) posts his thoughts.
Update: Annonymous commentor clarifies the situation, pointing out that Abu Risha and Sittar ar Rishawi are the same person.
General Petraeus immediately blamed the assassination on Al Qaeda. The news articles don't mention any claim of responsibility, and I don't see why the assassination couldn't have been the result of an old-fashioned power struggle.
Now the Washington Post and BBC are reporting that he was assassinated by a roadside bomb. This continues the trend of anyone who might conceivably play any role in Iraqi political reconciliation (although I doubt Abu Risha would have played any helpful role in that) being assassinated, or intimidated into fleeing Iraq.
What will happen to the Anbar Awakening, now that its progenitor has been killed? Will there be a succession struggle for the largess that the US military has showered on Abu Risha? Probably. Supposedly the actual head of the Anbar Awakening is Sheikh Sittar ar Rishawi, so now we can see whether Abu Risha was just a braggart or whether he actually played an important role.
Update: Marc Lynch (Abu Aardvark) posts his thoughts.
Update: Annonymous commentor clarifies the situation, pointing out that Abu Risha and Sittar ar Rishawi are the same person.
African narrative
The past week (really, the past 4 1/2 years), America has had a public debate over the war in Iraq. These numbers have been thrown against those numbers, raising the question "how do you know what you know?" This is a question various professors have asked in my classes again and again.
When Kenneth Pollack (now my professor) and Michael O'Hanlon wrote their op-ed in the New York Times, titled A War We Just Might Win (they did not choose the title), they were criticized for basing their claims off of a week-long tour of US military personnel and installations in Iraq, contextualized by an expertise in mostly conventional military operations. Glenn Greenwald, who I'd guess I share many political views with, is 110% convinced in his own righteousness in criticizing O'Hanlon for cherry-picking numbers (O'Hanlon's rebuttal largely rehashes his original points, showing how Greenwald and O'Hanlon are talking past each other).
When the seven soldiers from the 82nd Airborne wrote their op-ed, coming to opposite conclusions from Pollack and O'Hanlon, they were criticized because their knowledge was so immediate that they couldn't possibly see the larger picture.
Choosing objective measurable metrics, like Eli is trying to do, is a possible fix to this problem. But as he acknowledges, just because you can measure something doesn't mean it's valuable. The corollary to this is that just because something is valuable doesn't mean it's measurable. A further problem is just because a number matters today does not mean it will matter tomorrow - as Eli argues, the strategy has to drive the metrics. Strategies change over time, meaning metrics change over time. This leads to the possibility that the situation might be measurable today but not tomorrow. We are then back to square one. I disagreed with a lot of what LtC Gian Gentile said at this Heritage Foundation event, but he was right when he said that the best way to communicate the military/political situation in an insurgency is through narrative.
Recently Dan at TDAXP has frustrated me with his claims that the continent of Africa has sunk into an abyss of genocide, economic disaster and decay. His argument is that a Western recolonization of Africa is Africa's only hope.
I violently want to disagree with him - I think his data is either sketchy or irrelevant (why would Africans be too unintelligent to turn failed states into functioning states without foreign domination, but other failed societies self-corrected independently?) but I don't have the necessary data to back up my own claims (I actually don't think the data exists to prove or disprove it yet). Essentially my argument is similar to Nassim Nicholas Taleb's argument in The Black Swan - You think you know a lot and I think I know very little, but since in reality we both know very little, I'm ahead of you.
What touched off this rant was watching a video of Chris Abani's talk at TED titled "Learning the Stories of Africa." It's about the importance of narrative, and everybody should take 18 minutes of their time to go watch it.
When Kenneth Pollack (now my professor) and Michael O'Hanlon wrote their op-ed in the New York Times, titled A War We Just Might Win (they did not choose the title), they were criticized for basing their claims off of a week-long tour of US military personnel and installations in Iraq, contextualized by an expertise in mostly conventional military operations. Glenn Greenwald, who I'd guess I share many political views with, is 110% convinced in his own righteousness in criticizing O'Hanlon for cherry-picking numbers (O'Hanlon's rebuttal largely rehashes his original points, showing how Greenwald and O'Hanlon are talking past each other).
When the seven soldiers from the 82nd Airborne wrote their op-ed, coming to opposite conclusions from Pollack and O'Hanlon, they were criticized because their knowledge was so immediate that they couldn't possibly see the larger picture.
Choosing objective measurable metrics, like Eli is trying to do, is a possible fix to this problem. But as he acknowledges, just because you can measure something doesn't mean it's valuable. The corollary to this is that just because something is valuable doesn't mean it's measurable. A further problem is just because a number matters today does not mean it will matter tomorrow - as Eli argues, the strategy has to drive the metrics. Strategies change over time, meaning metrics change over time. This leads to the possibility that the situation might be measurable today but not tomorrow. We are then back to square one. I disagreed with a lot of what LtC Gian Gentile said at this Heritage Foundation event, but he was right when he said that the best way to communicate the military/political situation in an insurgency is through narrative.
Recently Dan at TDAXP has frustrated me with his claims that the continent of Africa has sunk into an abyss of genocide, economic disaster and decay. His argument is that a Western recolonization of Africa is Africa's only hope.
I violently want to disagree with him - I think his data is either sketchy or irrelevant (why would Africans be too unintelligent to turn failed states into functioning states without foreign domination, but other failed societies self-corrected independently?) but I don't have the necessary data to back up my own claims (I actually don't think the data exists to prove or disprove it yet). Essentially my argument is similar to Nassim Nicholas Taleb's argument in The Black Swan - You think you know a lot and I think I know very little, but since in reality we both know very little, I'm ahead of you.
What touched off this rant was watching a video of Chris Abani's talk at TED titled "Learning the Stories of Africa." It's about the importance of narrative, and everybody should take 18 minutes of their time to go watch it.
How to measure insurgencies
Here's an essay from my friend Eli, a fellow student in Georgetown's Security Studies Program. I might not agree with everything he says in this piece, but it deserves more of an audience than us arguing in a classroom (and probably more of an audience than most of the op-eds published in the Washington Post anyway).
How to measure insurgencies
Eli Margolis
Earlier this week, America’s top two officials in Iraq testified before Congress about the war in Iraq. Ambassador Crocker described slow but sure progress; General Petraeus spoke more strongly, citing goals met and “substantial” progress.
I was surprised. After a steady public debate of stalemate and withdrawal, the pair put forward recommendations to remain. The disconnect between how America has judged Iraq and how our two most knowledgeable professionals have is great.
Why?
I believe that the answer lies in measures. Media reports and independent assessments like the Brookings Institution’s “Iraq Index” have opened the floodgates on statistics. Analyses abound. But, as a recent Salon piece demonstrates, not all have been disciplined. Indeed, the public discourse has abandoned methodology entirely.
In an unusual move, however, Gen. Petraeus took time away from his testimony to assure Congress that he hasn’t. The military, he said, uses “a methodology that has been in place for well over a year” to ensure “rigor and consistency” in its analyses. Then he called in a second opinion: “Two U.S. intelligence agencies recently reviewed our methodology and they concluded that the data we produce is the most accurate and authoritative in Iraq.”
What is this methodology? Or, more broadly, how do we measure insurgencies?
To answer that question, I began to rummage around, uncovering a number of studies outlining insightful conceptual approaches. They hardly agree. But, taken together, they highlight five important principles.
First is the firm assertion that there are no magic numbers—not troops deployed, not dollars spent, not total number of insurgent attacks. As one of West Point’s “Irregular Warfare Messages of the Month” notes bluntly, “trying to reduce success or failure to one or two criteria is risky if not irresponsible.” Instead, suggests Craig Cohen of the U.S. Institute of Peace, it is better “to devise an aggregate index of indicators.” With measures, more may not always be better, but a handful will always be too few.
Second, analysts need a framework that attaches meaning to each metric. As James Clancy and Chuck Crossett explain in one of the Army’s leading journals, different officials too often find different meaning in the same numbers because they have no common reference. To one, falling casualties may be good news. But, to another, it is a sign of decreasing patrols—a possible indicator of heightened instability. The Army’s Douglas Jones phrases it simply: “it is only through agreement of definitions and a common framework of insurgency that applying measures of effectiveness to counterinsurgency operations becomes useful.” Without a framework, a pile of statistics can be made to fit almost any position.
Third, measures must be important, not just convenient. Counting heads at a graduation parade is far easier than measuring public opinion in a war zone or tracking insurgent financing. But it is a poorer measure of effectiveness. As Frederick W. Kagan notes in the Armed Forces Journal, such tallies of casualties, attacks, and trained locals “are measures of convenience, reflecting the ease with which data can be collected and presented rather than its inherent importance.” Honest assessment begins with honest data, even if it is difficult or dangerous to collect.
Fourth, outputs are more important than inputs. Measuring inputs like total dollars spent or the number of bases constructed gauges effort, not effectiveness. As Craig Cohen notes, progress should not be “judged in large part on the basis of international resources expended or programs implemented rather than on the basis of actual results produced.” In some ways, this is related to the problem of convenience; analysts can track coalition actions much more readily than their effects. But it is the effects—not efforts—that ultimately matter most.
Fifth—and perhaps most important—is the recognition that the strategy must determine the metrics. The two must be tied. If one campaign goal is to disrupt insurgent operations, for instance, a count of local cell phones would be little more than a statistical distraction. In their approaches, researchers from USIP, the Rand Corporation, the Johns Hopkins University, the Brookings Institution, and the Army’s Command and General Staff College all follow this principle. They start high and move down the ladder—from strategy to goals, from goals to measures, and from measures to specific metrics. As in a chain of command, each metric reports to a goal, and that goal back up to the strategy. This approach both highlights needed metrics and removes unneeded metrics—the cell phone counts of some government fact sheets.
So, before the testimony, how did the measures in America’s public discourse hold up next to these principles? In a word, poorly.
Media reports were misleading. Major newspapers continue to announce casualties and troop levels daily, encouraging a “magic number” mindset. The Washington Post’s series “Weighing the Surge” cites inputs like dollars of oil revenue spent or the number of Baghdad security outposts, and convenient counts like the number of market stalls opened, Iraqis trained, or barrels of oil produced. A graphic published the day before report is the perfect example. And a recent overview in the New York Times presents an array of measures without any mention of the author’s insightful framework.
But the media follows the lead of others. While interning with a government agency working to rebuild Iraq, I saw firsthand the random—and always positive—fact sheets that once circled Washington. Today’s Congressional benchmarks are only slightly better. The legislative requirements, for instance, are measures of convenience; in such a corrupt place, laws are cheap markers of government effectiveness and social change. Further, at least five of the eighteen benchmarks measure inputs and not outputs. And nor are they tied to strategy. As last Wednesday’s GAO report notes, they were derived not from methodical assessment, but from public statements made by severely pressured politicians.
Notably, such an application to Iraq should be taken with a degree of due reflection. These principles apply to insurgencies; the war in Iraq is more than an insurgency. Among others, tribal warlords, political opportunists, criminal networks, foreign intelligence services, and terrorist organizations complicate the picture considerably. Further, these troubles with measures do not necessarily discredit the broad conclusions of public discourse. Plainly, Iraq remains stubbornly unstable and violent.
But the guidelines outlined above can help—and not just with Iraq. The United States faces an international environment simmering with active and possible insurgencies. It is a challenge that will not go away. Bringing America’s public measures nearer its professional ones may help us develop clearer consensus—ensuring that our conflicts abroad do not also become our conflicts at home.
Update: Eli has graduated from Politics and Soccer and moved on to post this piece on Small Wars Journal. I'm only slightly jealous.
How to measure insurgencies
Eli Margolis
Earlier this week, America’s top two officials in Iraq testified before Congress about the war in Iraq. Ambassador Crocker described slow but sure progress; General Petraeus spoke more strongly, citing goals met and “substantial” progress.
I was surprised. After a steady public debate of stalemate and withdrawal, the pair put forward recommendations to remain. The disconnect between how America has judged Iraq and how our two most knowledgeable professionals have is great.
Why?
I believe that the answer lies in measures. Media reports and independent assessments like the Brookings Institution’s “Iraq Index” have opened the floodgates on statistics. Analyses abound. But, as a recent Salon piece demonstrates, not all have been disciplined. Indeed, the public discourse has abandoned methodology entirely.
In an unusual move, however, Gen. Petraeus took time away from his testimony to assure Congress that he hasn’t. The military, he said, uses “a methodology that has been in place for well over a year” to ensure “rigor and consistency” in its analyses. Then he called in a second opinion: “Two U.S. intelligence agencies recently reviewed our methodology and they concluded that the data we produce is the most accurate and authoritative in Iraq.”
What is this methodology? Or, more broadly, how do we measure insurgencies?
To answer that question, I began to rummage around, uncovering a number of studies outlining insightful conceptual approaches. They hardly agree. But, taken together, they highlight five important principles.
First is the firm assertion that there are no magic numbers—not troops deployed, not dollars spent, not total number of insurgent attacks. As one of West Point’s “Irregular Warfare Messages of the Month” notes bluntly, “trying to reduce success or failure to one or two criteria is risky if not irresponsible.” Instead, suggests Craig Cohen of the U.S. Institute of Peace, it is better “to devise an aggregate index of indicators.” With measures, more may not always be better, but a handful will always be too few.
Second, analysts need a framework that attaches meaning to each metric. As James Clancy and Chuck Crossett explain in one of the Army’s leading journals, different officials too often find different meaning in the same numbers because they have no common reference. To one, falling casualties may be good news. But, to another, it is a sign of decreasing patrols—a possible indicator of heightened instability. The Army’s Douglas Jones phrases it simply: “it is only through agreement of definitions and a common framework of insurgency that applying measures of effectiveness to counterinsurgency operations becomes useful.” Without a framework, a pile of statistics can be made to fit almost any position.
Third, measures must be important, not just convenient. Counting heads at a graduation parade is far easier than measuring public opinion in a war zone or tracking insurgent financing. But it is a poorer measure of effectiveness. As Frederick W. Kagan notes in the Armed Forces Journal, such tallies of casualties, attacks, and trained locals “are measures of convenience, reflecting the ease with which data can be collected and presented rather than its inherent importance.” Honest assessment begins with honest data, even if it is difficult or dangerous to collect.
Fourth, outputs are more important than inputs. Measuring inputs like total dollars spent or the number of bases constructed gauges effort, not effectiveness. As Craig Cohen notes, progress should not be “judged in large part on the basis of international resources expended or programs implemented rather than on the basis of actual results produced.” In some ways, this is related to the problem of convenience; analysts can track coalition actions much more readily than their effects. But it is the effects—not efforts—that ultimately matter most.
Fifth—and perhaps most important—is the recognition that the strategy must determine the metrics. The two must be tied. If one campaign goal is to disrupt insurgent operations, for instance, a count of local cell phones would be little more than a statistical distraction. In their approaches, researchers from USIP, the Rand Corporation, the Johns Hopkins University, the Brookings Institution, and the Army’s Command and General Staff College all follow this principle. They start high and move down the ladder—from strategy to goals, from goals to measures, and from measures to specific metrics. As in a chain of command, each metric reports to a goal, and that goal back up to the strategy. This approach both highlights needed metrics and removes unneeded metrics—the cell phone counts of some government fact sheets.
So, before the testimony, how did the measures in America’s public discourse hold up next to these principles? In a word, poorly.
Media reports were misleading. Major newspapers continue to announce casualties and troop levels daily, encouraging a “magic number” mindset. The Washington Post’s series “Weighing the Surge” cites inputs like dollars of oil revenue spent or the number of Baghdad security outposts, and convenient counts like the number of market stalls opened, Iraqis trained, or barrels of oil produced. A graphic published the day before report is the perfect example. And a recent overview in the New York Times presents an array of measures without any mention of the author’s insightful framework.
But the media follows the lead of others. While interning with a government agency working to rebuild Iraq, I saw firsthand the random—and always positive—fact sheets that once circled Washington. Today’s Congressional benchmarks are only slightly better. The legislative requirements, for instance, are measures of convenience; in such a corrupt place, laws are cheap markers of government effectiveness and social change. Further, at least five of the eighteen benchmarks measure inputs and not outputs. And nor are they tied to strategy. As last Wednesday’s GAO report notes, they were derived not from methodical assessment, but from public statements made by severely pressured politicians.
Notably, such an application to Iraq should be taken with a degree of due reflection. These principles apply to insurgencies; the war in Iraq is more than an insurgency. Among others, tribal warlords, political opportunists, criminal networks, foreign intelligence services, and terrorist organizations complicate the picture considerably. Further, these troubles with measures do not necessarily discredit the broad conclusions of public discourse. Plainly, Iraq remains stubbornly unstable and violent.
But the guidelines outlined above can help—and not just with Iraq. The United States faces an international environment simmering with active and possible insurgencies. It is a challenge that will not go away. Bringing America’s public measures nearer its professional ones may help us develop clearer consensus—ensuring that our conflicts abroad do not also become our conflicts at home.
Update: Eli has graduated from Politics and Soccer and moved on to post this piece on Small Wars Journal. I'm only slightly jealous.
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