First, check out the pictures of Arsenal player Eduardo's broken leg. Birmingham's Martin Taylor had a "mis-timed" tackle (studs up on Eduardo's shin) that gave Eduardo a compound fracture. Taylor was immediately red-carded. The pictures are here, but don't view them before lunch. Sky Sports decided the tackle was too horrific to replay on TV.
Taylor's coach said the tackle "is not even a yellow card."
If it weren't for that tackle and injury,k the game might have been notable for Theo Walcott's first two Premier League goals, Adebayor's really bad play, Birmingham's last-minute tying penalty, and William Gallas's fury. Highlights are here - no replays of the injury though because it wasn't allowed to be shown on TV.
Also check out this video as part of a FIFA Street 3 ad. It's below the cut.
Derrick Ashong on Barack Obama
Via Ethan Zuckerman, here are a couple videos. The first is by some random guy interviewing another random guy outside a Clinton vs. Obama debate. The second is the interviewee's (turns out to be a Ghanaian immigrant, Derrick Ashong) response on YouTube. Videos beneath the cut.
Senator Joe Biden was reportedly amazed to find a second articulate black man.
Senator Joe Biden was reportedly amazed to find a second articulate black man.
My thesis outline
Below the cut is my thesis outline, to show how I plan on analyzing the Tuareg insurgency.
- Introduction
- Scope of paper
- "Why care?"
- Main argument: Tuareg insurgency as a way of studying important factors in future conflicts, such as marginalization, environment, resources, smuggling, and “War on Terror”
- Secondary arguments
- A good case for comparing counterinsurgency strategies - usually it's very difficult to compare counterinsurgency efforts (for example Malaya vs. Vietnam) but Mali and Niger face very similar insurgencies and have different outcomes
- Look for evidence of qualitative shift in insurgencies (ala Kilcullen and Van Creveld)
- U.S. is investing lots of resources (Trans Saharan Counter Terrorism Partnership, etc.) - are they being used well?
- Background
- 1960s insurgency (historical narrative)
- 1990s insurgency (historical narrative
- Current violence
- Insurgents
- May 23 2006 D.A.C.
- Ibrahim Bahanga
- MNJ
- FARS
- Counterinsurgents
- Mali
- Niger
- Who's more effective?
- Tracing each variable 1990 - present
- Social and economic marginalization
- Environmental degradation
- Resource extraction
- Al Qaeda/Global War on Terror
- Role of smuggling - crime vs. war
- Analysis
- How the variables interact with each other
- Impact of each variable on decision to turn to violence
- Impact of each variable on decision to negotiate or give up violence
- Conclusions
Logic
It appears that even noted professors at Hahvihd with fancy vocabulary are not immune from logical errors.
Prof. Stephen Rosen is worried about Ahmadinejad's recent rhetorical escalation against Israel. He was worried that it might be a precursor to a chemical/biological weapons attack by Iran against Israel. So he checked some of his old research and found that, sure enough, when states use bio/chem weapons against their adversaries, it's preceded by dehumanization and rhetorical escalation!
In other words, he saw X and worried it might lead to Y. Sure enough, all instances of Y are preceded by X! Which of course says nothing about whether a) X causes Y, or b) whether or not there are 1000 Xs for every Y.
Ironically "silent evidence" is a key theme in Nassim Taleb's "The Black Swan", originally recommended to me by a former (current?) colleague in the Office of Net Assessment of Dr. Rosen's.
It would be interesting (and tedious and exhausting) to examine all instances of rhetorical escalation by states/armed groups, and see how often it actually leads to war crimes or the use of bio/chem weapons.
For what it's worth, I think Ahmadinejad's rhetoric is due to a) the assassination of Hezbollah's operations chief Imad Mughniyah, and b) his falling domestic approval ratings.
Prof. Stephen Rosen is worried about Ahmadinejad's recent rhetorical escalation against Israel. He was worried that it might be a precursor to a chemical/biological weapons attack by Iran against Israel. So he checked some of his old research and found that, sure enough, when states use bio/chem weapons against their adversaries, it's preceded by dehumanization and rhetorical escalation!
In other words, he saw X and worried it might lead to Y. Sure enough, all instances of Y are preceded by X! Which of course says nothing about whether a) X causes Y, or b) whether or not there are 1000 Xs for every Y.
Ironically "silent evidence" is a key theme in Nassim Taleb's "The Black Swan", originally recommended to me by a former (current?) colleague in the Office of Net Assessment of Dr. Rosen's.
It would be interesting (and tedious and exhausting) to examine all instances of rhetorical escalation by states/armed groups, and see how often it actually leads to war crimes or the use of bio/chem weapons.
For what it's worth, I think Ahmadinejad's rhetoric is due to a) the assassination of Hezbollah's operations chief Imad Mughniyah, and b) his falling domestic approval ratings.
Bibliography on Tuareg Insurgency
I just submitted my research design for my thesis on the Tuareg rebellion. Below I've pasted my bibliography for the benefit of anyone else studying this conflict (other than interviews which I will be keeping confidential). I've separated the sources into categories: general insurgency/counterinsurgency theory, general information on the Tuareg insurgency, the environmental factor, the resource-extraction factor, economic marginalization, and the impact of the U.S. "Global War on Terrorism".
Theoretical works on Insurgency
Have fun reading!
Theoretical works on Insurgency
Collier, Paul. 2000. Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Economic Analysis of Conflict. Vol. 44, No. 6, December, 2000. Pages 839-853
Collier, Paul. Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy. World Bank.. June 15, 2000.
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers. Vol. 56, No. 4, September, 2004. Pages 563-596.
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laintin. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political Science Review. Vol. 97, No. 1, February 2003. Pages 75-90.
Galula, David. Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958. RAND. 2006.
Kalyvas, Stathis. The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars. Perspectives on Politics. Vol. 1, No. 3, September 2003. Pages 475-494.
Kalyvas, Stathis. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006.
Kilcullen, David. Counterinsurgency Redux. Survival. Vol. 48, No. 4, Winter 2006-2007. Pages 111-130.
Lawrence, T. E. The 27 Articles of T. E. Lawrence. The Arab Bulletin. August 1917.
Lawrence, T. E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph. New York: Anchor, 1991.
Sepp, Kalev I. “Best Practices” in Counterinsurgency. Military Review. May-June 2005, pages 8-12.
Trinquier, Roger. Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. Pall Mall Press, London, 1964.
General on Tuareg Insurgency
Accord D'Alger Pour La Restauration de la Paix, de la Securite et du Developpement dans la Region de Kidal. July 2006 peace accords between Mali and the May 23, 2006 Democratic Alliance for Change.
Alliance Touaregue Niger-Mali. Blog of the ATNM. Updated infrequently. http://atnm.blogspot.com/.
Bush, Ray, and Jeremy Keenan. North Africa: Power, Politics & Promise. ROAPE. 33/108, 175-184.
Giuffrida, Alessandra. Clerics, Rebels and Refugees: Mobility Strategies and Networks among the Kel Antessar. Journal of North African Studies. 10/3, September 2005.
Humphreys, Macartan, and Habaye Ag Mohamed. Senegal and Mali. Understanding Civil War, Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, eds. World Bank, 2005.
Keenan, Jeremy. The Lesser Gods of the Sahara: Social Change and Indigenous Rights. Routledge, 2004.
Keenan, Jeremy. Tuareg take up arms. ROAPE. Vol. 33, Is. 108, 325-368.
Keita, Kalifa. Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army. May 1, 1998.
Lecocq, Baz. That Desert is Our Country:Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalism in Contemporary Mali (1946-1996). Unpublished PhD thesis, Amsterdam University, 2002.
Lecocq, Baz. This Country is Your Country: Territory, Borders, and Decentralisation in Tuareg Politics. Itinerario. 27/1, 2003, 58-78.
Mouvement des Nigeriens pour la Justice. Blog of the MNJ rebel movement. Updated regularly. http://m-n-j.blogspot.com/.
Niger: Extrajudicial Executions and Population Displacement in the North of the Country. Amnesty International. December 19, 2007.
Rasmussen, Susan J. The Tuareg. Endangered Peoples of Africa & the Middle East. Hitchcock & Osborn, ed., 2002.
Seely, Jennifer C. A political analysis of decentralisation: coopting the Tuareg threat in Mali. Journal of Modern African Studies, 39/3, 2001.
Weinberg, Bill. Voice of the Tuareg Resistance. World War 4 Report. December 1, 2007. Online at http://www.ww4report.com/node/4739.
Reuters, Voice Of America, La Republicain (Niger), Info-Matin (Mali) and L'Essor (Mali) will be my sources for government statements from Mali and Niger and other current news.
Environment
Brooks, Nick, and Isabelle Chiapello, Savino Di Lernia, Nick Drake, Michel Legrand, Cyril Moulin and Joseph Prospero. The Climate-Environment-Society Nexus in the Sahara from Prehistoric Times to the Presnt Day. The Journal of North African Studies. Vol. 10, No. 3, September 2005. Pages 253-292.
Brown, Oli, and Anne Hammill and Robert McLeman. Climate change as the 'new' security threat: implications for Africa. International Affairs. Vol. 83, No. 6, 2007. Pages 1141-1154.
Hershkowitz, Ann. The Tuareg in Mali and Niger: The Role of Desertification in Violent Conflict. ICE Case Studies. No. 151, August 2005. Available at http://www.american.edu/ted/ice/tuareg.htm.
Hirshleifer, Jack. The Bioeconomic Causes of War. Managerial and Decision Economics. Vol. 19, No. 7/8, Management, Organization and Human Nature, November 1998. Pages 457-466.
McConnell, Tristan. How Tuaregs, Hausas are Avoiding Another Darfur. Christian Science Monitor. October 3, 2007.
Pedersen, Jon, and Tor A. Benjaminsen. One Leg or Two? Food Security and Pastoralism in the Northern Sahel. Human Ecology. Vol. 36, Is. 1, February 2008, pages 43-57.
Trench, Pippa, and John Rowley, Marthe Diarra, Fernand Sano, and Boubacar Keita. Beyond Any Drought: Root causes of chronic vulnerability in the Sahel. Sahel Working Group. June 2007.
I'm still looking for a good data set for environmental data in the Sahara/Sahel region.
Uranium and the Rentier State
Addison, Tony, and Philippe Le Billon, and S. Mansoob Murshed. Conflict in Africa: The Cost of Peaceflu Behaviour. Journal of African Economies. Vol. 11, No. 3. Pages 365-386.
ag Maha, Issouf. Interview, Paris, November 22, 2007. (Issouf Ag Maha is the mayor of Tchirozerine in Niger, and is linked with the MNJ.) Video at http://www.dailymotion.com/related/4293876/video/x3m4v0_interview-issouf-ag-maha_news.
ag Maha, Issouf. Bravo for France, congratulatory [sic] for Areva, it's a pity for Tuaregs. north-of-africa.com. November 30, 2007. Online at http://www.north-of-africa.com/article.php3?id_article=453.
Barnes, Sandra. Global Flows: Terror, Oil & Strategic Philanthropy. Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE), 32/104, 235-252.
Corbier, Laurent. AREVA in Niger. AREVA Press Release. August 7, 2007.
Herbst, Jeffrey. Economic Incentives, Natural Resrouces and Conflict in Africa. Journal of African Economies. Vol. 9, No. 3. Pages 270-294.
Stratfor. Niger: Rebels, Resources and the Niger Delta Parallel. July 11, 2007.
Stratfor. Niger: The Tuaregs and Uranium Wealth. January 22, 2008.
Stratfor. Mali: Rising Tensions and Interest in the Sahel. September 13, 2007.
Economic Marginialization (almost all general articles contain info on marginalization)
Bergeret, Yves. School, the Tuaregs' New Weapon. The Unesco Courier, October 2000.
Mazzitelli, Antonio L. Transnational organized crime in West Africa; the additional challenge. International Affairs, 83/6, 2007.
Al Qaeda/GWoT
Abramovici, Pierre. United States: the new scramble for Africa. Le Monde diplomatique. July 2004. At: http://mondediplo.com/2004/07/07usinafrica.
Archer, Toby, and Tihomir Popovic. The Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative: The US War on Terrorism in North Africa. Finnish Institute of International Affairs. 2007.
Barth, Mustafa. Sand Castles in the Sahara: US Military Basing in Algeria. ROAPE. 30/98, 679-685.
Berschinski, Robert G. AFRICOM's Dilemma: The “Global War on Terrorism,” “Capacity Buliding,” Humanitarianism, and the future of U.S. security policy in Africa. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army, November 2007.
Burton, Fred and Scott Stewart. Tablighi Jamaat: An Indirect Line to Terrorism. Stratfor. January 23, 2008.
Gutelius, David. Islam in Northern Mali and the War on Terror. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 25/1 January 2007.
Gutelius, David. War on Terror and Social Networks in Mali. ISIM Review, Spring 2006.
Hunt, Emily. Islamist Terrorism in Northwestern Africa: A 'Thorn in the Neck' of the United States? The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Policy Focus #65, February 2007.
International Crisis Group. Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction? Africa Report No. 92, March 31st 2005.
Jebnoun, Noureddine. Is the Maghreb the “Next Afghanistan:?: Mapping the Radicalization of the Algerian Salafi Jihadist Movement. Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown, 2007.
Jourde, Cedric. Constructing Representations of the Global War on Terror in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 25/1, January 2007.
Kaplan, Robert. America's African Rifles. The Atlantic Monthly. April 2005.
Keenan, Jeremy. Americans & 'bad people' in the Sahara-Sahel. Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE). Vol. 31, Is. 99, March 2004, 125-164.
Keenan, Jeremy. Political Destabilisation and 'Blowback' in the Sahel. ROAPE. Vol. 31, Is. 102, 691-698.
Keenan, Jeremy. Famine in Niger is not all that it seems. ROAPE. Vol. 32, Is. 104, 395-477.
Keenan, Jeremy. Terror in the Sahara: The Impliactions of US Imperialism for North & West Africa. ROAPE. Vol. 33, Is. 101, 475-496.
Keenan, Jeremy. Security & Insecurity in North Africa. ROAPE. Vol. 33, Is. 108, pp. 269-296.
Keenan, Jeremy. Military bases, construction contracts, & Hydrocarbons in North Africa. ROAPE. Vol. 33, Is. 109, 577-614.
Keenan, Jeremy. US Silence as Sahara Military Base Gathers Dust. ROAPE. Vol. 34, Is. 113, 588-590.
Keenan, Jeremy. The Collapse of the Second Front. Foreign Policy in Focus. September 26, 2006. Online at http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3544.
Keenan, Jeremy. Conspiracy theories and 'terrorists': How the 'war on terror' is placing new responsibilities on anthropology. Anthropology Today, Vol. 22, Is. 6, December 2006, 4-9.
Keenan, Jeremy. The Banana Theory of Terrorism: Alternative Truths and the Collapse of the 'Second' (Saharan) Front in the War on Terror. Journal of Contemporary African Studies. Vol. 25, No. 1, Jan 2007, 31-58.
Keenan, Jeremy. My country right or wrong. Anthropology Today. Vol. 23, Is. 1, February 2007 , 26-27.
Khatchadourian, Raffi. Pursuing Terrorists in the Great Desert: The U.S. Military's $500 Million Gamble to Prevent the Next Afghanistan. The Village Voice. January 31st, 2006.
Lecocq, Baz, and Paul Schrijver. The War on Terror in a Haze of Dust: Potholes and Pitfalls on the Saharan Front. Journal of Contempotrary African Studies. 25/1, January 2007.
Le Sage, Andre. African Counterterrorism Cooperation: Assessing Regional and Subregional Initiatives. Potomac Books Inc., 2007.
Mellah, Salima, and Jean-Baptiste Rivoire. El Para, the Maghreb's Bin Laden. Le Monde diplomatique. February 2005.
Secrets in the Sand. BBC Radio program. August 8th, 2005.
Tattersall, Nick. Tuareg rebels in southern Sahara no Islamist threat. Reuters. September 23, 2007.
Also, U.S. involvement in Niger and Mali has received coverage in a lot of Stars & Stripes articles that I'll use (although searches for “Tuareg” and “Touareg” get zero hits).
Have fun reading!
Loltraders
After witnessing the recent marriage proposal and acceptance on I Can Has Cheezburger, I realized that lolcats can NEVER be taken too far. I was also inspired by Abu Muqawama's lolhamas pictures (more here). With no further ado, I give you the result of collaboration between Flanders and I, loltraders!
What is "The Vix"
Adrian was curious so I wrote an entry on it.
What is the VIX?
"VIX is the ticker symbol for the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index, a popular measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. Referred to by some as the fear index, it represents one measure of the market's expectation of volatility over the next 30 day period." Thank you wikipedia.
I am one of those who refer to it as the "fear index." Simply put, the higher the VIX (the more volatility) the more fear is out there. So why is the VIX useful to us? It is a good predictor of market bottoms. A typical VIX reading is somewhere between 10 and 30. A VIX reading of 30 or higher denotes a significant amount of fear out in the market. Some interesting things to note. The absolute bottom of the 2000-2002 bear market had a VIX reading of 50. Short term corrections during the bull market from 2002-2007 had VIX readings in the high/mid 30's. The VIX briefly touched 37 during the recent January 22nd, 2008 bottom. In the market crash of 1987, the VIX hit a reading of above 100.
So when the VIX jumps up, why is that likely signalling a bottom? Basically, if there is a lot of fear, it means people are panic selling. All these "weak holders" are chased out of their stocks and once they all sell prices will no longer continue to be pushed down and can start going up again. Another way of saying panic selling is capitulation. Until the market under goes capitulation, we cannot hit a true bottom because many stock holders are eager to get out and every time prices come up a little bit, they will sell and knock the prices back down. When the VIX hits 50+ all those people who were looking to sell on any bounce will have unloaded all of their stocks out of fear of lower prices, so stocks can finally begin going up again.
Why do I think this is not the "true" bottom for the stock market? A number of reasons.
1. The VIX only hit 37. While that is a high reading, we have had a 5 year bull market and there has been a lot of speculative excess, just look at the turmoil in the credit markets. The idea that a 5 year bull market can just take a 3 month breather, hit bottom and resume its run is a little far fetched. The average bull market lasts 3 years and the average bear lasts 1 year.
2. TV commentators (most notably Cramer) are calling this the "bottom."
3. When stocks have been selling off, its on big volume, when stocks go up its on light volume. That is not the sign of a healthy, bull market. Its the sign of a bear market. Every attempted rally since the Jan 22nd low has been sold off into on higher volume than the rally.
4. Investors Intelligence Survey did not have a "cross"(a cross is when more people surveyed report being bears instead of being bulls), bulls still outnumber bears.
5. Put/Call Ratio, similar to the VIX, when it reads over 2.0 it tends to mark bottoms. The reading was not close to this.
6. Friends of mine are buying Apple. Nothing screams "This is not a bottom" when you have amateurs buying up former market leaders at "bargain" prices.
7. The short interest is DECREASING.(short interest is the number of shares sold short ie. people who sell shares short are betting that prices will decline further. If there are fewer shares sold short it means people are taking those bets off the table.) I find this very interesting. Basically, in the last couple weeks the numbers of shares that have been sold short has dropped. This means shorts have been BUYING BACK their shares. Now is this a bullish or bearish sign? An absolutely bearish sign. All these low volume rallies have probably been due to shorts buying back their shares and all the high volume sell offs have been due to people dumping their positions. Guess what happens when all the shorts who wanted to buy back their shares have done so.
8. At market bottoms you tend to have huge short interest. These short sellers help fuel the rally off the lows because they are forced to buy back their shares due to fear of losses. Like I just mentioned, this is not the case.
What is the VIX?
"VIX is the ticker symbol for the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index, a popular measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. Referred to by some as the fear index, it represents one measure of the market's expectation of volatility over the next 30 day period." Thank you wikipedia.
So when the VIX jumps up, why is that likely signalling a bottom? Basically, if there is a lot of fear, it means people are panic selling. All these "weak holders" are chased out of their stocks and once they all sell prices will no longer continue to be pushed down and can start going up again. Another way of saying panic selling is capitulation. Until the market under goes capitulation, we cannot hit a true bottom because many stock holders are eager to get out and every time prices come up a little bit, they will sell and knock the prices back down. When the VIX hits 50+ all those people who were looking to sell on any bounce will have unloaded all of their stocks out of fear of lower prices, so stocks can finally begin going up again.
Why do I think this is not the "true" bottom for the stock market? A number of reasons.
1. The VIX only hit 37. While that is a high reading, we have had a 5 year bull market and there has been a lot of speculative excess, just look at the turmoil in the credit markets. The idea that a 5 year bull market can just take a 3 month breather, hit bottom and resume its run is a little far fetched. The average bull market lasts 3 years and the average bear lasts 1 year.
2. TV commentators (most notably Cramer) are calling this the "bottom."
3. When stocks have been selling off, its on big volume, when stocks go up its on light volume. That is not the sign of a healthy, bull market. Its the sign of a bear market. Every attempted rally since the Jan 22nd low has been sold off into on higher volume than the rally.
5. Put/Call Ratio, similar to the VIX, when it reads over 2.0 it tends to mark bottoms. The reading was not close to this.
6. Friends of mine are buying Apple. Nothing screams "This is not a bottom" when you have amateurs buying up former market leaders at "bargain" prices.
8. At market bottoms you tend to have huge short interest. These short sellers help fuel the rally off the lows because they are forced to buy back their shares due to fear of losses. Like I just mentioned, this is not the case.
Intel and Counter-Terrorism
Since quitting my job in December, I've been able to go to more talks and events during the day. I went to a couple talks at Georgetown this past week on intelligence and counterterrorism. Below are some of my takeaways.
The first talk was by Michael Leiter, Acting Director of the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC). Although a friend and I spent most of his talk trying to figure out what audience he thought he was addressing (retirement home? Community library? We finally settled on girl scout troupe), the Q&A session got more interesting and in depth. A couple gems of information:
Sheehan spent a little time talking about what he called the "Maginot Line" of counterterrorism - stuff like scanning incoming shipping containers for radiation, trying to catch terrorists at border crossings, etc. Sheehan feels the centers of gravity for counterterrorism operations need to be basic intelligence tradecraft, police work, and eliminating the hype so people feel comfortable getting on with life after a terrorist attack. He noted that the Brits were taking the subway in London three hours after the 7/7 attacks, and that Israelis go back to the mall the day after it was hit. This of course requires that uninformed speculation be kept to a minimum.
Update: I believe "Quintin" at NCTC is Quintan Wiktorowicz. I stumbled across an article in the International Review of Social History on using popular intellectuals as a "point of contention" in framing contests in fighting Al Qaeda.
Quintan Wiktorowicz. Framing Jihad: Intramovement Framing Contests and al-Qaeda's Struggle for Sacred Authority. International Review of Social History, Volume 49, Supplement S12, December 2004, pp 159-177.
The first talk was by Michael Leiter, Acting Director of the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC). Although a friend and I spent most of his talk trying to figure out what audience he thought he was addressing (retirement home? Community library? We finally settled on girl scout troupe), the Q&A session got more interesting and in depth. A couple gems of information:
- NCTC has (barely) more actual employees than contractors (450 vs. 400), something Leiter is rather proud of and justifiably so, given the ratio in other parts of the intel community (CIFA is over 70% contractors).
- The information flow from top down (that is to say, from DNI or DHS down to local cops) is OK, it is much more difficult for information to flow up, from local cops/intel shops up to the feds. I interpret this to mean that they've managed to solve the classification troubles where locals weren't cleared to view the information sent to them, but have yet to solve the problem of useless intel being sent up the chain of command.
- Leiter feels that having law enforcement and intelligence powers in the same organization is a good thing. Bill Odom feels the opposite - in his book Fixing Intelligence, Gen. Odom argues that you can't have cops and intelligence in the same organization due to culture clashes. i.e., when you find bad guys, do you arrest them once you have enough evidence for prosecution, or do you run counterintelligence ops, feed them disinformation, and roll up the cell later?
- NCTC is apparently the coordinator for the anti-terrorism part of U.S. strategic communications/public diplomacy. I didn't get to ask him my question of how he thinks Smith-Mundt applies to NCTC (sorry Matt). But they apparently have a whole 15 analysts working on the subject, including one guy named Quintin* who Leiter went on and on about.
Sheehan spent a little time talking about what he called the "Maginot Line" of counterterrorism - stuff like scanning incoming shipping containers for radiation, trying to catch terrorists at border crossings, etc. Sheehan feels the centers of gravity for counterterrorism operations need to be basic intelligence tradecraft, police work, and eliminating the hype so people feel comfortable getting on with life after a terrorist attack. He noted that the Brits were taking the subway in London three hours after the 7/7 attacks, and that Israelis go back to the mall the day after it was hit. This of course requires that uninformed speculation be kept to a minimum.
Update: I believe "Quintin" at NCTC is Quintan Wiktorowicz. I stumbled across an article in the International Review of Social History on using popular intellectuals as a "point of contention" in framing contests in fighting Al Qaeda.
Quintan Wiktorowicz. Framing Jihad: Intramovement Framing Contests and al-Qaeda's Struggle for Sacred Authority. International Review of Social History, Volume 49, Supplement S12, December 2004, pp 159-177.
Quote of the day
"If the Protect America Act is allowed to expire, Americans will be at risk."John Boehner, House Republican Minority Leader.
H.R. 5349: To extend the Protect America Act of 2007 for 21 days
Nay OH-8 Boehner, John [R]
Washington Post editorial
Washington Post's "Good Sense on Iraq"
Violence in Iraq is increasing, because the groups that had allied with us (CLCs and tribal Awakening groups) finally got fed up with the lack of political benefits. They decided, why be allied with Americans if the Shi'a still kill us? We were unable to answer the question Marc Lynch had been asking for over a year, about how to integrate our local Sunni allies with the Shi'a government.
The progress since last summer has been remarkable. ...it's worth asking why Democratic presidential candidates Barack Obama and Hillary Rodham Clinton remain so unwilling to alter their outdated and dogmatic views about the war.Contrast with:
What with this and the Anbar Salvation Council threatening to take up arms against the elected council and refusing to fly the new Iraqi flag and dismissing the entire Parliament as illegitimate and Awakenings leaders declaring that no Iraqi police are allowed in their territory and clashing with them when they do and blaming Shi'ite militias (and not al-Qaeda) for the wave of attacks against them and fighting over territory and threatening to quit if they aren't paid, it really is hard to see why anybody would think that there might be anything troublesome about the relationship between the Awakenings and the Iraqi "state". Nothing to see here but great big gobs of victory folks, please move along.One has a track record of good analysis, and the other has a large audience. The Washington Post editorial board (aka Fred Hiatt) is disconnected from reality. I'm pretty sure that if we had just listened to Fred Hiatt and the Washington Post for the last 6 years, and then done the opposite, it'd be like hitting the easy button and freedom would be on the march. It's ironic that, at the very moment that Fred Hiatt is labeling Obama and Clinton's policy views "outdated", McClatchy runs a story on the failure of the policy that Hiatt champions.
Violence in Iraq is increasing, because the groups that had allied with us (CLCs and tribal Awakening groups) finally got fed up with the lack of political benefits. They decided, why be allied with Americans if the Shi'a still kill us? We were unable to answer the question Marc Lynch had been asking for over a year, about how to integrate our local Sunni allies with the Shi'a government.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)