THE BAD
"Above all, we must understand that our enemies are emboldened by signs of weakness... Our retreat from Lebanon in 1983 and from Somalia in 1993 convinced them that our will was weak."This argument is used to bludgeon into submission those who wish to change policy by telling them it is a "sign of weakness." In fact America's "will" IS weak when concerning areas like Lebanon and Somalia, because Americans can't find them on a map. Why should we send our children to die in places we didn't even know existed? Those who advocate a militarist foreign policy typically berate Americans and their politicians for being "weak" when Americans refuse to support ill-conceived or ill-executed military blunders (like Iraq, Somalia, Lebanon, etc.). The blunder is American policy-makers trying to play hegemon with a public that isn't willing to accept the costs. Unfortunately this is an error made to some degree by all the candidates (at least all the ones that have a shot).
This argument is also related to something Ugly - the obsession many politicians, in my opinion especially those on the Right, have with showing strength and power. More on this in the Ugly section.
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"The purpose of this fight must be to defeat the terrorists and the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan and to allow these countries to become members of the international system in good standing... Our aim should be to help them build accountable, functioning governments that can serve the needs of their populations, reduce violence within their borders, and eliminate the export of terror."Well at least Giuliani defines "victory" here. However this goal is out of reach in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Afghanistan has never had a functioning government by Western standards and one popping up soon is unlikely. Any government that is able to solidify power in Iraq and function normally will probably have accrued that power through the widespread use of violence, and thus could never be a member of the international system "in good standing."
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Giuliani has a section of the essay titled "A Stronger Defense," in which he argues that "The idea of a post-Cold War 'peace dividend' was a serious mistake... we must rebuild a military force that can deter aggression and meet the wide variety of present and future challenges." Here is his wishlist:
- A minimum of ten new brigade combat teams
- More submarines
- More modern long-range bombers
- More in-flight refueling tankers
- A global missile defense system
- A constellation of satellites "that can watch arms factories everywhere around the globe, day and night, above- and belowground"
- Increased surveillance and screening at ports
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"[The UN] has not lived up to the great hopes that inspired its creation... International law and institutions exist to serve peoples and nations, but many leaders act as if... institutions, not the ends to be achieved, were the important thing."
The idea that international institutions are tools to be discarded after they have served the purpose of some national state is short-sighted, in my view. I would have put this in the "Ugly" section, but Giuliani tempers this statement by saying in the next paragraph "the great objectives of humanity would become even more difficult to achieve without mechanisms for international discussion." From reading the whole section dealing with institutions it seems that Giuliani is trying to back off from appearing to be a John Bolton-esque UN "reformer" while still appealing to those pundits who feel the UN is a waste of time. In the end I think Giuliani's point is that nation-states matter and institutions don't, except to the extent that the United States can use them.
This concludes the relatively longer Bad section. Check back tomorrow for the truly Ugly stuff.
7 comments:
Regarding weakness:
I agree with you that America's will is weak. That said, war is a bargaining process, and observed prior outcomes (and not just weakness-of-will going in) matter in the "negotiations." Demonstrate weakness, and expect either worse outcomes or higher costs to get the outcomes you could have had anyway.
Your criticisms (that certain actions were "ill-conceived," &c.) may or may not be true. However, they are not relevent in this case.
Regarding victory:
Giuliani's words are purposefully cryptic here. If you had written this as a criticism, you would have a point. As is, though, you debate with the clouds.
Regarding spending:
Giuliani's implied support for both a military-industrial complex and a sysadmin-industrial complex is one of the greatest reasons I support him.
Our disagreement, of course, may be reasonable. I support shrinking the gap. Someone who opposes this goal would have no interest in spending to reach it.
Regarding international institutions:
If we examine international institutions since the 1980s, we've seen the power of one (the International Court of justice) collapse, the standing of another (the Security Council) change significantly, and a third (the dispute settlement bodies under the World Trade Organization) become the most powerful global institution in the history of man.
There is a reasonable, but wrong, argument to be made that international stability should be persued through institutional stability. After all, the United States did not achieve stability through this and that body, but under one United States federal government. Giuliani's position, however, is that institutions only matter to the extent they provide goods for the United States and the international system (that is, they are not worthy in themselves). Good for him.
I'll take the WTO over the ICJ any day.
TDAXP - If you make your rhetoric almost solely about strength and weakness, then you lock yourself into your existing course of action, as any deviation can be construed as a sign of "weakness". I think that's inappropriate for a democracy. Essentially we made the choice that in order to preserve liberty at home, we will be worse doing some things, like war, intelligence gathering, etc. - but that the benefits of liberty are worth it.
How are Giuliani's words cryptic regarding victory? He states what his aims would be - he wants Iraq and Afghanistan to transform into Turkey.
I fail to see how a ballistic missile defense shield will help "shrink the gap." And as I've posted before, I'm leaning towards telling the Gap to shrink itself anyway (we can help, but not with more B-2s).
re: Institutions - I would argue that NATO is an institution worth preserving (and expanding) for its own sake as something that can bestow legitimacy on US actions (like Kosovo) - just because it might be a pain to accommodate the lack of continental European defense spending in the short term doesn't mean that we should act outside of NATO as a routine matter of course.
If you make your rhetoric almost solely about strength and weakness, then you lock yourself into your existing course of action, as any deviation can be construed as a sign of "weakness"
Agreed.
I think that's inappropriate for a democracy.
Or for any self-interested actor!
Essentially we made the choice that in order to preserve liberty at home, we will be worse doing some things, like war, intelligence gathering, etc. - but that the benefits of liberty are worth it.
Perhaps true, but how is this relevant?
How are Giuliani's words cryptic regarding victory? He states what his aims would be - he wants Iraq and Afghanistan to transform into Turkey.
I think you just answered my question!
The formulation he used - indeed, the one you criticized him for -- "to allow these countries to become members of the international system in good standing... Our aim should be to help them build accountable, functioning governments that can serve the needs of their populations, reduce violence within their borders, and eliminate the export of terror." -- appear to be no more or less than to be a "state" in the sense that has predominated since the Peace of Westphalia. While certainly this reference would be immediately picked up by readers of Foreign Affairs, the same cannot be said for a general audience.
I fail to see how a ballistic missile defense shield will help "shrink the gap."
BMD has two purposes, on a medium and large scale.
On a medium scale, it is designed to remove the ability of rogue states (on the size of North Korea, Iran, etc) who defend themselves through a policy of MAD against the United States. With a BMD, North Korea is only able to threaten the capital of South Korea. Without it, Pyongyang is able to threaten both Beijing and Tokyo.
On a large scale, BMD is a first-strike weapon designed to prevent the rump force left behinda fter a nuclear strike from responding in an effective way. Without BMD, the failure of the US Navy's access-denial strategy means a large-scale war is lost. With BMD, that is no longer true.
Now, BMD is costly. It's clear how BMD helps (prevents rogue states from holding us hostage and unstable large states from resuming a period of interstate wars). It's also clear that those funds can be used for other things, too.
And as I've posted before, I'm leaning towards telling the Gap to shrink itself anyway
Africa has descended back into misery and horror since decolonization. Currently, Africa appears to be in a steady-state of low intelligence and bad government.
What grounds do you have for believing that your policy's consistent record of genocidal failure will turn around within the next few centuries?
I would argue that NATO is an institution worth preserving (and expanding) for its own sake as something that can bestow legitimacy on US actions (like Kosovo) -
In other words, you would argue that NATO is an institution worth preserving (and expanding) for the sake that it can bestow legitimacy on US actions?
If that line was your attempt to draw a line between yourself and Giuliani, then it is a fine line indeed!
"In other words, you would argue that NATO is an institution worth preserving (and expanding) for the sake that it can bestow legitimacy on US actions?"
I was unclear in my comment - I should have used "ensure" rather than "bestow". By "bestow legitimacy" I meant "bestow legitimacy upon legitimate actions and restrain America from illegitimate actions." Treating institutions as tools to be discarded means that if one institution denies you legitimacy (other than a disfunctional UN in 1999), you simply create your own institution (a Coalition of the willing) to manufacture a facsimile of legitimacy, and your actions are not restrained.
re: Africa - I fully admit my ideas on Africa are not final products. However I'd caution you against the assertion that all of Africa is a state of misery and horror. This would be an example of the Gap shrinking itself.
If you are holding up DR Congo as a sign of light for Africa, then what is your definition of dark!?!
Congo is a large country - it has room for both horror and hope.
Congo is a large country - it has room for both horror and hope.
Indeed. That is true of most states large enough to support genocidal violence.
Does your hopeful future for Africa involve a continuation of this level of democide? As long as you can still find hopeful anecdotes among the corpses?
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