Taylor's coach said the tackle "is not even a yellow card."
If it weren't for that tackle and injury,k the game might have been notable for Theo Walcott's first two Premier League goals, Adebayor's really bad play, Birmingham's last-minute tying penalty, and William Gallas's fury. Highlights are here - no replays of the injury though because it wasn't allowed to be shown on TV.
Also check out this video as part of a FIFA Street 3 ad. It's below the cut.
Senator Joe Biden was reportedly amazed to find a second articulate black man.
- Scope of paper
- "Why care?"
- Main argument: Tuareg insurgency as a way of studying important factors in future conflicts, such as marginalization, environment, resources, smuggling, and “War on Terror”
- Secondary arguments
- A good case for comparing counterinsurgency strategies - usually it's very difficult to compare counterinsurgency efforts (for example Malaya vs. Vietnam) but Mali and Niger face very similar insurgencies and have different outcomes
- Look for evidence of qualitative shift in insurgencies (ala Kilcullen and Van Creveld)
- U.S. is investing lots of resources (Trans Saharan Counter Terrorism Partnership, etc.) - are they being used well?
- 1960s insurgency (historical narrative)
- 1990s insurgency (historical narrative
- Current violence
- May 23 2006 D.A.C.
- Ibrahim Bahanga
- Who's more effective?
- Tracing each variable 1990 - present
- Social and economic marginalization
- Environmental degradation
- Resource extraction
- Al Qaeda/Global War on Terror
- Role of smuggling - crime vs. war
- How the variables interact with each other
- Impact of each variable on decision to turn to violence
- Impact of each variable on decision to negotiate or give up violence
Prof. Stephen Rosen is worried about Ahmadinejad's recent rhetorical escalation against Israel. He was worried that it might be a precursor to a chemical/biological weapons attack by Iran against Israel. So he checked some of his old research and found that, sure enough, when states use bio/chem weapons against their adversaries, it's preceded by dehumanization and rhetorical escalation!
In other words, he saw X and worried it might lead to Y. Sure enough, all instances of Y are preceded by X! Which of course says nothing about whether a) X causes Y, or b) whether or not there are 1000 Xs for every Y.
Ironically "silent evidence" is a key theme in Nassim Taleb's "The Black Swan", originally recommended to me by a former (current?) colleague in the Office of Net Assessment of Dr. Rosen's.
It would be interesting (and tedious and exhausting) to examine all instances of rhetorical escalation by states/armed groups, and see how often it actually leads to war crimes or the use of bio/chem weapons.
For what it's worth, I think Ahmadinejad's rhetoric is due to a) the assassination of Hezbollah's operations chief Imad Mughniyah, and b) his falling domestic approval ratings.
Theoretical works on Insurgency
Collier, Paul. 2000. Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Economic Analysis of Conflict. Vol. 44, No. 6, December, 2000. Pages 839-853
Collier, Paul. Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy. World Bank.. June 15, 2000.
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers. Vol. 56, No. 4, September, 2004. Pages 563-596.
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laintin. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political Science Review. Vol. 97, No. 1, February 2003. Pages 75-90.
Galula, David. Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958. RAND. 2006.
Kalyvas, Stathis. The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars. Perspectives on Politics. Vol. 1, No. 3, September 2003. Pages 475-494.
Kalyvas, Stathis. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006.
Kilcullen, David. Counterinsurgency Redux. Survival. Vol. 48, No. 4, Winter 2006-2007. Pages 111-130.
Lawrence, T. E. The 27 Articles of T. E. Lawrence. The Arab Bulletin. August 1917.
Lawrence, T. E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph. New York: Anchor, 1991.
Sepp, Kalev I. “Best Practices” in Counterinsurgency. Military Review. May-June 2005, pages 8-12.
Trinquier, Roger. Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. Pall Mall Press, London, 1964.
General on Tuareg Insurgency
Accord D'Alger Pour La Restauration de la Paix, de la Securite et du Developpement dans la Region de Kidal. July 2006 peace accords between Mali and the May 23, 2006 Democratic Alliance for Change.
Alliance Touaregue Niger-Mali. Blog of the ATNM. Updated infrequently. http://atnm.blogspot.com/.
Bush, Ray, and Jeremy Keenan. North Africa: Power, Politics & Promise. ROAPE. 33/108, 175-184.
Giuffrida, Alessandra. Clerics, Rebels and Refugees: Mobility Strategies and Networks among the Kel Antessar. Journal of North African Studies. 10/3, September 2005.
Humphreys, Macartan, and Habaye Ag Mohamed. Senegal and Mali. Understanding Civil War, Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, eds. World Bank, 2005.
Keenan, Jeremy. The Lesser Gods of the Sahara: Social Change and Indigenous Rights. Routledge, 2004.
Keenan, Jeremy. Tuareg take up arms. ROAPE. Vol. 33, Is. 108, 325-368.
Keita, Kalifa. Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army. May 1, 1998.
Lecocq, Baz. That Desert is Our Country:Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalism in Contemporary Mali (1946-1996). Unpublished PhD thesis, Amsterdam University, 2002.
Lecocq, Baz. This Country is Your Country: Territory, Borders, and Decentralisation in Tuareg Politics. Itinerario. 27/1, 2003, 58-78.
Mouvement des Nigeriens pour la Justice. Blog of the MNJ rebel movement. Updated regularly. http://m-n-j.blogspot.com/.
Niger: Extrajudicial Executions and Population Displacement in the North of the Country. Amnesty International. December 19, 2007.
Rasmussen, Susan J. The Tuareg. Endangered Peoples of Africa & the Middle East. Hitchcock & Osborn, ed., 2002.
Seely, Jennifer C. A political analysis of decentralisation: coopting the Tuareg threat in Mali. Journal of Modern African Studies, 39/3, 2001.
Weinberg, Bill. Voice of the Tuareg Resistance. World War 4 Report. December 1, 2007. Online at http://www.ww4report.com/node/4739.
Reuters, Voice Of America, La Republicain (Niger), Info-Matin (Mali) and L'Essor (Mali) will be my sources for government statements from Mali and Niger and other current news.
Brooks, Nick, and Isabelle Chiapello, Savino Di Lernia, Nick Drake, Michel Legrand, Cyril Moulin and Joseph Prospero. The Climate-Environment-Society Nexus in the Sahara from Prehistoric Times to the Presnt Day. The Journal of North African Studies. Vol. 10, No. 3, September 2005. Pages 253-292.
Brown, Oli, and Anne Hammill and Robert McLeman. Climate change as the 'new' security threat: implications for Africa. International Affairs. Vol. 83, No. 6, 2007. Pages 1141-1154.
Hershkowitz, Ann. The Tuareg in Mali and Niger: The Role of Desertification in Violent Conflict. ICE Case Studies. No. 151, August 2005. Available at http://www.american.edu/ted/ice/tuareg.htm.
Hirshleifer, Jack. The Bioeconomic Causes of War. Managerial and Decision Economics. Vol. 19, No. 7/8, Management, Organization and Human Nature, November 1998. Pages 457-466.
McConnell, Tristan. How Tuaregs, Hausas are Avoiding Another Darfur. Christian Science Monitor. October 3, 2007.
Pedersen, Jon, and Tor A. Benjaminsen. One Leg or Two? Food Security and Pastoralism in the Northern Sahel. Human Ecology. Vol. 36, Is. 1, February 2008, pages 43-57.
Trench, Pippa, and John Rowley, Marthe Diarra, Fernand Sano, and Boubacar Keita. Beyond Any Drought: Root causes of chronic vulnerability in the Sahel. Sahel Working Group. June 2007.
I'm still looking for a good data set for environmental data in the Sahara/Sahel region.
Uranium and the Rentier State
Addison, Tony, and Philippe Le Billon, and S. Mansoob Murshed. Conflict in Africa: The Cost of Peaceflu Behaviour. Journal of African Economies. Vol. 11, No. 3. Pages 365-386.
ag Maha, Issouf. Interview, Paris, November 22, 2007. (Issouf Ag Maha is the mayor of Tchirozerine in Niger, and is linked with the MNJ.) Video at http://www.dailymotion.com/related/4293876/video/x3m4v0_interview-issouf-ag-maha_news.
ag Maha, Issouf. Bravo for France, congratulatory [sic] for Areva, it's a pity for Tuaregs. north-of-africa.com. November 30, 2007. Online at http://www.north-of-africa.com/article.php3?id_article=453.
Barnes, Sandra. Global Flows: Terror, Oil & Strategic Philanthropy. Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE), 32/104, 235-252.
Corbier, Laurent. AREVA in Niger. AREVA Press Release. August 7, 2007.
Herbst, Jeffrey. Economic Incentives, Natural Resrouces and Conflict in Africa. Journal of African Economies. Vol. 9, No. 3. Pages 270-294.
Stratfor. Niger: Rebels, Resources and the Niger Delta Parallel. July 11, 2007.
Stratfor. Niger: The Tuaregs and Uranium Wealth. January 22, 2008.
Stratfor. Mali: Rising Tensions and Interest in the Sahel. September 13, 2007.
Economic Marginialization (almost all general articles contain info on marginalization)
Bergeret, Yves. School, the Tuaregs' New Weapon. The Unesco Courier, October 2000.
Mazzitelli, Antonio L. Transnational organized crime in West Africa; the additional challenge. International Affairs, 83/6, 2007.
Abramovici, Pierre. United States: the new scramble for Africa. Le Monde diplomatique. July 2004. At: http://mondediplo.com/2004/07/07usinafrica.
Archer, Toby, and Tihomir Popovic. The Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative: The US War on Terrorism in North Africa. Finnish Institute of International Affairs. 2007.
Barth, Mustafa. Sand Castles in the Sahara: US Military Basing in Algeria. ROAPE. 30/98, 679-685.
Berschinski, Robert G. AFRICOM's Dilemma: The “Global War on Terrorism,” “Capacity Buliding,” Humanitarianism, and the future of U.S. security policy in Africa. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army, November 2007.
Burton, Fred and Scott Stewart. Tablighi Jamaat: An Indirect Line to Terrorism. Stratfor. January 23, 2008.
Gutelius, David. Islam in Northern Mali and the War on Terror. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 25/1 January 2007.
Gutelius, David. War on Terror and Social Networks in Mali. ISIM Review, Spring 2006.
Hunt, Emily. Islamist Terrorism in Northwestern Africa: A 'Thorn in the Neck' of the United States? The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Policy Focus #65, February 2007.
International Crisis Group. Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction? Africa Report No. 92, March 31st 2005.
Jebnoun, Noureddine. Is the Maghreb the “Next Afghanistan:?: Mapping the Radicalization of the Algerian Salafi Jihadist Movement. Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown, 2007.
Jourde, Cedric. Constructing Representations of the Global War on Terror in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 25/1, January 2007.
Kaplan, Robert. America's African Rifles. The Atlantic Monthly. April 2005.
Keenan, Jeremy. Americans & 'bad people' in the Sahara-Sahel. Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE). Vol. 31, Is. 99, March 2004, 125-164.
Keenan, Jeremy. Political Destabilisation and 'Blowback' in the Sahel. ROAPE. Vol. 31, Is. 102, 691-698.
Keenan, Jeremy. Famine in Niger is not all that it seems. ROAPE. Vol. 32, Is. 104, 395-477.
Keenan, Jeremy. Terror in the Sahara: The Impliactions of US Imperialism for North & West Africa. ROAPE. Vol. 33, Is. 101, 475-496.
Keenan, Jeremy. Security & Insecurity in North Africa. ROAPE. Vol. 33, Is. 108, pp. 269-296.
Keenan, Jeremy. Military bases, construction contracts, & Hydrocarbons in North Africa. ROAPE. Vol. 33, Is. 109, 577-614.
Keenan, Jeremy. US Silence as Sahara Military Base Gathers Dust. ROAPE. Vol. 34, Is. 113, 588-590.
Keenan, Jeremy. The Collapse of the Second Front. Foreign Policy in Focus. September 26, 2006. Online at http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3544.
Keenan, Jeremy. Conspiracy theories and 'terrorists': How the 'war on terror' is placing new responsibilities on anthropology. Anthropology Today, Vol. 22, Is. 6, December 2006, 4-9.
Keenan, Jeremy. The Banana Theory of Terrorism: Alternative Truths and the Collapse of the 'Second' (Saharan) Front in the War on Terror. Journal of Contemporary African Studies. Vol. 25, No. 1, Jan 2007, 31-58.
Keenan, Jeremy. My country right or wrong. Anthropology Today. Vol. 23, Is. 1, February 2007 , 26-27.
Khatchadourian, Raffi. Pursuing Terrorists in the Great Desert: The U.S. Military's $500 Million Gamble to Prevent the Next Afghanistan. The Village Voice. January 31st, 2006.
Lecocq, Baz, and Paul Schrijver. The War on Terror in a Haze of Dust: Potholes and Pitfalls on the Saharan Front. Journal of Contempotrary African Studies. 25/1, January 2007.
Le Sage, Andre. African Counterterrorism Cooperation: Assessing Regional and Subregional Initiatives. Potomac Books Inc., 2007.
Mellah, Salima, and Jean-Baptiste Rivoire. El Para, the Maghreb's Bin Laden. Le Monde diplomatique. February 2005.
Secrets in the Sand. BBC Radio program. August 8th, 2005.
Tattersall, Nick. Tuareg rebels in southern Sahara no Islamist threat. Reuters. September 23, 2007.
Also, U.S. involvement in Niger and Mali has received coverage in a lot of Stars & Stripes articles that I'll use (although searches for “Tuareg” and “Touareg” get zero hits).
Have fun reading!
What is the VIX?
"VIX is the ticker symbol for the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index, a popular measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. Referred to by some as the fear index, it represents one measure of the market's expectation of volatility over the next 30 day period." Thank you wikipedia.
So when the VIX jumps up, why is that likely signalling a bottom? Basically, if there is a lot of fear, it means people are panic selling. All these "weak holders" are chased out of their stocks and once they all sell prices will no longer continue to be pushed down and can start going up again. Another way of saying panic selling is capitulation. Until the market under goes capitulation, we cannot hit a true bottom because many stock holders are eager to get out and every time prices come up a little bit, they will sell and knock the prices back down. When the VIX hits 50+ all those people who were looking to sell on any bounce will have unloaded all of their stocks out of fear of lower prices, so stocks can finally begin going up again.
Why do I think this is not the "true" bottom for the stock market? A number of reasons.
1. The VIX only hit 37. While that is a high reading, we have had a 5 year bull market and there has been a lot of speculative excess, just look at the turmoil in the credit markets. The idea that a 5 year bull market can just take a 3 month breather, hit bottom and resume its run is a little far fetched. The average bull market lasts 3 years and the average bear lasts 1 year.
2. TV commentators (most notably Cramer) are calling this the "bottom."
3. When stocks have been selling off, its on big volume, when stocks go up its on light volume. That is not the sign of a healthy, bull market. Its the sign of a bear market. Every attempted rally since the Jan 22nd low has been sold off into on higher volume than the rally.
5. Put/Call Ratio, similar to the VIX, when it reads over 2.0 it tends to mark bottoms. The reading was not close to this.
6. Friends of mine are buying Apple. Nothing screams "This is not a bottom" when you have amateurs buying up former market leaders at "bargain" prices.
8. At market bottoms you tend to have huge short interest. These short sellers help fuel the rally off the lows because they are forced to buy back their shares due to fear of losses. Like I just mentioned, this is not the case.
The first talk was by Michael Leiter, Acting Director of the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC). Although a friend and I spent most of his talk trying to figure out what audience he thought he was addressing (retirement home? Community library? We finally settled on girl scout troupe), the Q&A session got more interesting and in depth. A couple gems of information:
- NCTC has (barely) more actual employees than contractors (450 vs. 400), something Leiter is rather proud of and justifiably so, given the ratio in other parts of the intel community (CIFA is over 70% contractors).
- The information flow from top down (that is to say, from DNI or DHS down to local cops) is OK, it is much more difficult for information to flow up, from local cops/intel shops up to the feds. I interpret this to mean that they've managed to solve the classification troubles where locals weren't cleared to view the information sent to them, but have yet to solve the problem of useless intel being sent up the chain of command.
- Leiter feels that having law enforcement and intelligence powers in the same organization is a good thing. Bill Odom feels the opposite - in his book Fixing Intelligence, Gen. Odom argues that you can't have cops and intelligence in the same organization due to culture clashes. i.e., when you find bad guys, do you arrest them once you have enough evidence for prosecution, or do you run counterintelligence ops, feed them disinformation, and roll up the cell later?
- NCTC is apparently the coordinator for the anti-terrorism part of U.S. strategic communications/public diplomacy. I didn't get to ask him my question of how he thinks Smith-Mundt applies to NCTC (sorry Matt). But they apparently have a whole 15 analysts working on the subject, including one guy named Quintin* who Leiter went on and on about.
Sheehan spent a little time talking about what he called the "Maginot Line" of counterterrorism - stuff like scanning incoming shipping containers for radiation, trying to catch terrorists at border crossings, etc. Sheehan feels the centers of gravity for counterterrorism operations need to be basic intelligence tradecraft, police work, and eliminating the hype so people feel comfortable getting on with life after a terrorist attack. He noted that the Brits were taking the subway in London three hours after the 7/7 attacks, and that Israelis go back to the mall the day after it was hit. This of course requires that uninformed speculation be kept to a minimum.
Update: I believe "Quintin" at NCTC is Quintan Wiktorowicz. I stumbled across an article in the International Review of Social History on using popular intellectuals as a "point of contention" in framing contests in fighting Al Qaeda.
Quintan Wiktorowicz. Framing Jihad: Intramovement Framing Contests and al-Qaeda's Struggle for Sacred Authority. International Review of Social History, Volume 49, Supplement S12, December 2004, pp 159-177.
H.R. 5349: To extend the Protect America Act of 2007 for 21 days
Nay OH-8 Boehner, John [R]
The progress since last summer has been remarkable. ...it's worth asking why Democratic presidential candidates Barack Obama and Hillary Rodham Clinton remain so unwilling to alter their outdated and dogmatic views about the war.Contrast with:
What with this and the Anbar Salvation Council threatening to take up arms against the elected council and refusing to fly the new Iraqi flag and dismissing the entire Parliament as illegitimate and Awakenings leaders declaring that no Iraqi police are allowed in their territory and clashing with them when they do and blaming Shi'ite militias (and not al-Qaeda) for the wave of attacks against them and fighting over territory and threatening to quit if they aren't paid, it really is hard to see why anybody would think that there might be anything troublesome about the relationship between the Awakenings and the Iraqi "state". Nothing to see here but great big gobs of victory folks, please move along.One has a track record of good analysis, and the other has a large audience. The Washington Post editorial board (aka Fred Hiatt) is disconnected from reality. I'm pretty sure that if we had just listened to Fred Hiatt and the Washington Post for the last 6 years, and then done the opposite, it'd be like hitting the easy button and freedom would be on the march. It's ironic that, at the very moment that Fred Hiatt is labeling Obama and Clinton's policy views "outdated", McClatchy runs a story on the failure of the policy that Hiatt champions.
Violence in Iraq is increasing, because the groups that had allied with us (CLCs and tribal Awakening groups) finally got fed up with the lack of political benefits. They decided, why be allied with Americans if the Shi'a still kill us? We were unable to answer the question Marc Lynch had been asking for over a year, about how to integrate our local Sunni allies with the Shi'a government.
President Bush has not done enough to back up his threats against Iran and Syria... part of a larger trend of Bush combining strong words with weak actions....This has a little grounding in history. For instance, Khrushchev put missiles in Cuba in part because he thought he could get away with it, because JFK was weak and inexperienced. However this seems pretty remote from the current situation, given the over-reliance on the military in our foreign policy, a good deal of which is structural/institutional, and thus not dependent on the President's personality.
It is hard to see how Bush could reverse this decline in America's "fear factor" during the remaining year of his presidency. That will be the job of the next president. And who would be the most up to the task?
To answer that question, ask yourself which presidential candidate an Ahmadinejad, Assad or Kim would fear the most. I submit it is not Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama or Mike Huckabee... Ironically, John McCain's bellicose aura could allow us to achieve more of our objectives peacefully because other countries would be more afraid to mess with him than with most other potential occupants of the Oval Office -- or the current one.
But if we want to elect McCain solely because he's trigger-happy and a little unbalanced, why stop at McCain? I say we resurrect Curtis LeMay from the dead and elect him. He's only slightly older than McCain anyway, and he surely would scare the rest of the world (seeing as they are insufficiently scared of our brilliant military policy in Iraq and Afghanistan).
An addendum - I find it ironic that the "crazy" candidate is publicly anti-torture, while the "reasonable" one, supported by Wall Street Republicans, wanted to double Gitmo.
I was wrong about Ghana vs. Cote D'Ivoire being the final, but I was right that it would be a great game. The third place game was a six goal thriller. Highlights are below the cut.
- Pros: huge upside with his potential to rally the country around him and get new people involved in politics (which will come in handy during the coming recession and exit from Iraq). Good tech policy.
- Cons: so hyped that an Obama presidency would probably be a big disappointment no matter how successful he actually is. Poor health care plan. Inexperienced.
- Pros: good health care plan. Smart and experienced. Two for one deal with Bill Clinton.
- Cons: half the country has an irrational hatred for her. Tries to pass stupid restrictions on video games. Political dynasties are bad (1981-2013 with either a Bush or Clinton in the White House).
- Pros: his nomination/election might see the implosion of the Republican party. Experienced. Surprisingly sane by the standards of today's GOP.
- Cons: trigger happy. Old. Opposes torture and suspension of habeus corpus, but caved in to Bush on the Military Commissions Act by allowing the President to define torture and exclude who retains their habeus corpus rights (rendering the Act meaningless).
The biggest surprise? That I agree with TDAXP!
(Warning - graphic video)
The terrorist repeatedly asks the kidnapped man (who's name is Tareq) "Are you Sunni or Shi'ite?" Tareq finally answers "Iraqi", and is killed. I think the text then says "Executed - sedition is worse than killing" (apparently a Koranic verse), with the final text saying "Terrorism has no religion." (Translation from Inside Iraq.)
They also have other videos as well as posters here (Arabic).
Here are the highlights.
Egypt vs. Angola
Ghana vs. Nigeria (10 man Ghana come from behind to win)
Cameroon vs. Tunisia (in overtime!)
And I have to post the highlights of Cote D'Ivoire demolishing Guinea:
In Niger, a centuries-old custom that allows people to make jokes at the expense of their "cousins" from other tribes, far from exacerbating ethnic tensions, actually has a calming effect on them.Being of Scandinavian heritage, we have jokes where we make fun of ourselves, playing off the stereotype of cheap, hardworking, dumb and romantically inept Norwegians/Swedes. They make the occasional appearance on Prairie Home Companion. Here are a couple:
Under the accepted "rules", the person targeted has to put a brave face on things and anyone who loses his temper or gets upset when "attacked" becomes a laughing stock within his own community, Ali Bida said.
But in a time of heightened tension caused by a Tuareg rebellion in the north, some people in Niger find the practice increasingly difficult.
Sidi, a Tuareg living in Niamey says he is sick and tired of hearing his Djerma "cousins" call him a "bandit" and tease him about planting anti-personnel mines.
In April, Niger authorities even plan to organise a "National Week of Ethnic Jokes" with radio programmes, conferences, joke competitions and cultural evenings.
Vun day, Sven vas valking down da street ven who did he see driving a brand new Chevrolet? It vas Ole. Ole pulled up to him vit a vide smile.
"Ole, vere did ya get dat car?" Sven asked.
"Lena gave it to me".
"She gave it to you? I knew she vas sveet on you, but dis?".
"Vell, let me tell you vat happened. Ve vere driving out on county road 6, in da middle of novere. Lena pulled off da road into da woods. She parked, got out of da car, trew off alla her clothes and said, "Ole take vatever you vant."...So I took da car"
"Ole, your a smart man, dem clothes never voulda fit ya."
Sven was just pulling his boat up on shore when Ole wandered up with a puzzlement:
Ole: Sven! Vat cho been doin?
Sven: I bin fishin, Ole. Wha cho tink I bin doin with dese here rods?
Ole: Ditcha catch anythin?
Sven: (Under his breath: "Dumb svede.") Of course I catch somethin. Sven alvays catches ven he fishes.
Ole: If I guess how many you catch will you gimme one o' dem?
Sven: If you guesses how many I catch I'll give you BOTH a dem!
Ole: I guess TREE!
Sven: Dat ain't bad for a Svede. You only missed it by TWO!
Also interesting is that the MNJ, which is a rural insurgency, based in the desert, has now threatened to occupy Nigerien cities such as Arlit, close to the uranium mines, and Agadez, the regional capital. It will be interesting to see whether a largely rural insurgency can make the transition to urban warfare.